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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The concept of intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign 
state is a controversial one, and it is a project the international com-
munity is loath to take on. But once a decision to intervene has been 
made, the controversy is usually at an end. In most instances, the 
goals of such an intervention are clear: bring a halt to violence and 
humanitarian violations, preserve peace, and facilitate the 
(re)building and (re)establishment of a liberal democratic political 
system.1 In other words, once the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council or other intergovernmental organization has decided to de-
ploy a peacekeeping mission or a peace agreement is brokered among 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Counsel and Katz Fellow, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law; J.D. 
NYU Law School, 2005. Special thanks go to Professor Benedict Kingsbury. The Author 
would also like to thank Professors Monroe Price, Barry Friedman, Samuel Issacharoff, 
Angelina Fischer, and Harlan Cohen, as well as Liz Sepper, Kristina Daugirdas, and Chris 
Bradley for helpful comments and conversations. Any shortcomings remain solely the re-
sponsibility of the Author. 
 1. This Article takes no position on the question whether it is appropriate for the in-
ternational community to intervene within the territory of sovereign nations or to engage 
in nation-building projects. Nor does it grapple with the question whether democracy and 
democratization is the proper path for every nation-state. It simply recognizes that current 
policy dictates democratization projects in areas subject to international intervention and 
considers ways in which these projects may be more successful with respect to democrati-
zation of the media environment. It is true that there should perhaps be some limits that 
constrain the scope or extent of administrative and legislative powers exercised by interna-
tional intervention forces. See, e.g., Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict 
Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant’s Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL 
L.J. 285, 287 (2005) (arguing that a distinct jus post bellum framework based on principles 
of trusteeship, accountability, and proportionality is required by international actors). The 
goal of these interventions is nearly always to establish a democratic political system. 
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warring parties, the high-profile political negotiations and rhetoric 
usually die down.  
 The nearly universally accepted goals of peace and democratiza-
tion are presumed to provide guidance to those tasked with designing 
and implementing the nuts and bolts of the UN mission. Because the 
ultimate goal is a democratic society, the norms, principles, and 
standards that govern democratic institutions should form the basis 
of the agenda for those responsible for bringing about democracy. Af-
ter all, if the territory or nation is expected to follow in the footsteps 
of the western liberal democracies, the accepted norms that apply in 
those states must be instilled and respected in the transitional state. 
 Within established democracies, norms and standards have devel-
oped for the treatment of all of societal institutions. High govern-
ment officials must be chosen through elections with universal adult 
suffrage. The institution with lawmaking powers should be separate 
from the one with the power to enforce the law. Legal disputes 
should be decided by neutral and impartial adjudicators. And so on. 
Some of these fundamental principles are enshrined in international 
treaties, national constitutions, or domestic law that is binding on all 
actors. Others are simply norms that have developed organically over 
time and which are commonly accepted as necessary in a democratic 
society.  
 One institution for which universally accepted—though not le-
gally binding—norms have developed is the media. As a crucial 
player in both the exercise and the facilitation of the right to freedom 
of expression,2 the media is viewed by intergovernmental organiza-
tions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and various agencies 
of international and domestic governance as fundamental to the ex-
ercise of all other rights in a democratic society. As a result, very 
specific norms and standards have developed surrounding the me-
dia.3 There are expectations regarding the media itself—that it 
should be independent, that it should act with professionalism, that 
it should reflect a plurality of viewpoints on salient issues. But there 
are also standards according to which other societal institutions, in-
cluding governments, should treat media entities—that they should 
respect media independence by refraining from imposing regulations, 
that journalists should have access to relevant information, and 
so on.  
 When international administrators were dispatched to both Bos-
nia and Kosovo in the 1990s to assist in post-conflict transitions fol-
                                                                                                                     
 2. Unlike the nonbinding secondary norms that govern treatment of the media, the 
right to freedom of expression is a fundamental human right enshrined in multiple human 
rights instruments. See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.  
 3. See infra Part II.A.  
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lowing civil wars, these principles guided the administrators’ reform 
goals. In both places, the local media had a history of being aligned 
with or controlled by political factions and of contributing to the ex-
isting divisions and hostilities between various segments of society 
through inflammatory, ethnically-biased reporting.4 Because of the 
media’s destabilizing tendency in these places, international admin-
istrators in both locations very quickly determined that media reform 
was an integral element of democratic institution-building. So they 
set out to transform the Bosnian and Kosovar media into an inde-
pendent, professional, and pluralist sector.  
 What their experience shows is that, while generally accepted in-
ternational norms and standards may define the desired result of 
media democratization,5 those same principles may not provide suffi-
cient guidance for determining the means by which that result can be 
achieved. The assumption that the norms that function so well in es-
tablished, stable democracies also should provide the standards to be 
applied in transitional societies fails to recognize that democratiza-
tion is not democracy.6 And in circumstances of democratization, the 
institutions of government and civil society do not yet operate accord-
ing to the principles that govern these institutions in democratic so-
cieties. Indeed, if they did, no democratization would be necessary. 
And when the conditions in a democratizing society differ from those 
in established democracies in ways that render the relevant accepted 
standards and norms ineffective, strict adherence to those norms will 
impede, rather than facilitate, the ultimate development of a success-
ful democracy.  
 Using the lens of the media reform efforts undertaken in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, this Article will explore the idea that, under certain cir-
cumstances, departure from established liberal democratic norms 
might permit a more efficient, effective reform process. It will con-
sider which characteristics of Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s post-conflict so-
cieties created hurdles to democratization of the media environment, 
how the reform efforts failed to account for those hurdles, and what 
steps might have been taken to minimize the impediments to reform. 
It also will discuss how the lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo might 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See infra Part III.A. 
 5. Throughout this Article, the concept of media democratization refers to the proc-
ess of reforming or transforming the relevant media sector into one which exhibits the 
hallmarks of what is considered the ideal media in a democratic society: independence, 
professionalism, and pluralism. 
 6. See JAMES PUTZEL & JOOST VAN DER ZWAN, WHY TEMPLATES FOR MEDIA 
DEVELOPMENT DO NOT WORK IN CRISIS STATES: DEFINING AND UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN POST-WAR AND CRISIS STATES 17 (2006) (London School of 
Economics Crisis States Research Centre), available at 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/837/01/MEDIA.REPORT.pdf (“The default template for media as-
sistance assumes the existence of a functioning state and government.”). 
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guide reformers’ thinking about which type of policies might best be 
deployed in what is currently the most high-profile democratization 
process underway—Iraq.  
 A caveat is now in order. One of the most important conclusions 
advanced in this Article is that the context in which any transition to 
democracy takes place is highly salient. Any plan for reform will 
need to account for the historical, religious, political, ethnic, and geo-
graphical foibles that are specific to the country or territory in ques-
tion. This being the case, the lessons learned from any one nation’s 
experience do not necessarily apply to that of any other. In other 
words, the ability to generalize this Article’s analysis, which is based 
on the experience of early reform efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, may 
be limited. Nonetheless, the very process of approaching media re-
form suggested by this Article, namely examining the context in 
which the reform will be implemented, considering how that context 
differs from that of established democracies, and then adjusting the 
norms by which the reformers are bound in order to account for those 
differences, can only help in making the ultimate reform plan a more 
effective one. 
 The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II.A sets out the estab-
lished norms surrounding the media accepted in liberal democracies 
and to which, according to many actors involved in media reform in 
the Balkans, the international reformers should have adhered. Part 
II.B then discusses possible justifications for departing from those 
norms, many of which were present in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Part 
III goes on to describe the context in which media reform was under-
taken in both Bosnia and Kosovo and then discusses those reform ef-
forts, the bases for opposition to them that arose, and suggestions for 
more effective reform. Part IV considers the situation in Iraq in light 
of the lessons that may be drawn from the Bosnia and Kosovo experi-
ences. The Article then briefly concludes.  
II.   DEMOCRACY & DEMOCRATIZATION 
 In post-conflict situations where the international community in-
tervenes, its ultimate goal is to reestablish in the formerly conflict-
torn territory or country a liberal democracy in the Western Euro-
pean/North American model.7 All institution-building and reform ef-
                                                                                                                     
 7. Evidence of the international community’s endorsement and promotion of democ-
racy as the preferred form of governance comes from many sources. International human 
rights treaties, for example, establish the right to self-determination and right to self-
governance as fundamental human rights. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 1, 25, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217A, arts. 21(3), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration] (“The will of the people shall be the basis of the author-
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forts are simply instrumental means aimed at achieving this goal. 
The media component of these reform efforts is a result of the senti-
ment that both the right to free expression and a vibrant free press 
are considered integral elements of liberal democracies.8 While the 
entitlements to free expression, to seek out information, and to hold 
opinions are important in their own right,9 “the full enjoyment of 
                                                                                                                     
ity of government . . . .”). The work of multiple UN agencies also encourages and facilitates 
the promotion and development of democratic governance. See Strengthening of Popular 
Participation, Equity, Social Justice and Non-Discrimination as Essential Foundations of 
Democracy, U. N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Res. 2001/36, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/L.47 (Apr. 14, 2003); Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, ECOSOC Res. 
2000/47, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/L.45/Rev.1 (Apr. 18, 2000); Promotion of the Right to De-
mocracy, ECOSOC Res. 1999/57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.55/Rev.2 (Apr. 26, 1999); United 
Nations Democracy Fund, Situating the UN Democracy Fund in the Global Arena, 
http://www.un.org/democracyfund/XSituatingDemocracy.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2008) 
(“[D]emocracy lies at the heart of the UN’s normative value system and underpins what 
the organization does at an operational level. Indeed, most departments, funds, pro-
grammes and agencies proceed explicitly from this foundation, especially since a human-
rights-based approach to development programming has become the norm.”); see also Ed-
ward Newman & Roland Rich, Building Democracy with UN Assistance: From Namibia to 
Iraq: Has the UN Found the Right Formula for Promoting Democracy?, UN CHRON., Dec. 
2004-Feb. 2005, at 25, available at 
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/issue4/0404p25.html (“The ideal of democratic gov-
ernance underpins much of the contemporary work of the United Nations.”). Moreover, the 
mandates of international peacekeeping efforts in post-conflict societies from Kosovo to 
Cambodia to East Timor all include a provision for democratization or the organization 
and conduct of elections. E.g., ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, 
OSCE MISSION IN KOSOVO: MANDATE, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/1999/ 
07/2577_en.pdf; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cambodia: 
UNTAC Mandate, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacmandate.html (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2008) United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, East 
Timor: UNMISET Mandate, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/mandate.html (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2008).  
 8. E.g., Press Release, United Nations Democracy Fund, Secretary-General Sees 
Free Press an Essential Feature of Democracy (Apr. 23, 2007) (“Free press discharges the 
vital work of informing and educating the voting public without fear, harassment or cen-
sorship . . . .”); Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE Mission in 
Kosovo: Media Standards, http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13419.html (last visited Aug. 25, 
2008) [hereinafter OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Media Standards] (“A free and responsible 
media is an integral component of any democratic society.”). 
 9. These rights are enshrined in all of the major human rights instruments. Organi-
zation of African Unity, African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 9(1) 
& (2), adopted June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter Banjul Charter] (“Every indi-
vidual shall have the right to receive information. Every individual shall have the right to 
express and disseminate his opinions within the law.”); Organization of American States 
[O.A.S.], American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention] (“Everyone has the right to free-
dom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart in-
formation and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice.”); ICCPR, supra note 7, 
art. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of 
his choice.”); Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Con-
vention] (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
822  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:817 
 
[free expression] is the most potent force to achieve individual free-
doms, strengthen democracy, and pre-empt repression, conflict, war 
and genocide.”10 It is only through the exercise of free expression 
rights that the necessary civil society can develop and that the citi-
zenry can become fully informed on issues relevant to self-
governance. Further, it is only the preservation of the right to seek 
information that will ensure transparent, accountable government 
action, thus strengthening the democratic nature of government in-
stitutions. Absent information regarding, for example, rights-
infringing government behavior, democratic voters cannot demand a 
change in policy or vote the rights-infringers out of power. Only a 
citizenry that is both aware of infringements on rights and free to 
voice opposition to those infringements will be able to influence its 
government’s actions and policies, thus forcing it to be rights-
respecting. Information therefore enables both participation and em-
powerment. The existence of norms ensuring the free flow of infor-
mation is thus an “essential foundation[]”11 of democratic society—a 
necessary precondition for liberal democracy to flourish. 
 These norms surrounding the free flow of information, which lead 
to the more specific norms regarding the press set forth below, are 
considered fundamental to a stable, successful democracy. Conse-
quently, any process of democratization will include an effort to em-
bed them into the society in transition. After setting out the specific 
standards that have developed for a democratic free press, this Part 
will discuss the concept of democratization, especially in the context 
of post-conflict, deeply divided societies. It does not dispute that the 
                                                                                                                      
dom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”); Universal Declaration, supra note 7, art.  
19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”); O.A.S., American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. IV, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948) (“Every person has the 
right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of 
ideas, by any medium whatsoever.”).  
 10. ARTICLE 19, Our Work Overview, http://www.article19.org/work/index.html (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2008); see also Lingens v. Austria, 1986 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 170, 171 
(Eur. Ct. of H.R.); Reyes v. Chile, Case 12.108, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 60/03, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2, ¶ 59 (2003); African Union, African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, 
32d Sess., pmbl. (2002); Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Declaration on Freedom of 
Expression and Information in the Media in the Context of the Fight Against Terrorism, 
917th Mtg., pmbl. (Mar. 2, 2005); Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Declaration on 
Freedom of Political Debate in the Media, 872d Mtg., pmbl. (Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter 
Declaration on Freedom of Political Debate in the Media]; Council of Eur., Comm. of  
Ministers, Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Information, ¶ 1, 4 (Apr. 29, 1982) 
[hereinafter Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Information]; O.A.S., Inter-
American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 108th 
Sess., pmbl. (2000) [hereinafter Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of 
Expression].  
 11. E.g., Lingens v. Austria, 1986 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 170, 171 (Eur. Ct. of H.R.). 
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ultimate goal of democratization must and should remain the imple-
mentation of democratic norms and institutions across society, in-
cluding in the media sector. It will argue, however, that in the proc-
ess of bringing these norms and institutions into existence, it is not 
always necessary to adhere strictly to the norms themselves. In fact, 
there are certain circumstances in which strict adherence to the 
principles surrounding the media that have developed in established 
democracies will impede the evolution of the media sector into one 
that, some day, will be able to operate according to those norms. In 
those circumstances, media reform efforts must be free to depart 
from accepted liberal norms for the media in order to create an envi-
ronment where those very norms might eventually take hold. 
A.   DEMOCRATIC MEDIA NORMS 
 The free flow of information, which is so essential to effective self-
governance, is greatly facilitated by the existence of an effective free 
press. To be an effective facilitator of information flow, the press 
must play several specific roles and exhibit several specific 
characteristics. Because they are seen as so integral to a successful 
and healthy democracy, these desirable roles and characteristics 
have evolved into a set of baseline norms regarding the media, which 
apply to actors both within and outside the media industry itself, and 
to which members of democratic societies are expected to adhere. It 
is these principles that provide the goals to which international 
media reformers in Bosnia and Kosovo aspired. They also explain 
why those reformers undertook some reform efforts that were 
doomed to failure12 and why such strident opposition arose to other 
reform efforts that were sorely needed.13  
 While the free press is extolled as an essential element of liberal 
democracy, a direct contributor to democratic strength, as well as a 
vehicle for the democratic benefits flowing from the free flow of in-
formation in other contexts, the term “free press” is rarely defined. In 
fact, transnational treatment of the press indicates that the concept 
of “free press” has a very specific meaning. The ways that the media 
is expected to use its free flow of information rights and to facilitate 
the exercise of others’ rights to the free flow of information are not 
indeterminate. It is true that the information-flow regime must be 
flexible enough to allow the media to operate. But to ensure that the 
media operate in the manner that is envisioned, that operation must 
be constrained by limiting principles. In other words, the “free press” 
as a theoretical concept is not a core principle of democracy integral 
to the effective exercise of the fundamental right to the free flow of 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 13. See infra Part III.B.2. 
824  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:817 
 
information; the free press is only those things if it functions in a 
very specifically defined fashion. So while “free press” usually goes 
undefined in discussions of its place in the democracy-building and 
free flow of information regime, there is, in fact, a definition implicit 
in the international community’s conception of the ways that the 
ideal media is expected to perform.14  
 First and foremost, the press must play the role of watchdog, scru-
tinizing government action and ensuring that the public has infor-
mation regarding political issues and other topics of public interest. 
Ensuring that the press can be a government watchdog increases 
transparency of government actions, thus contributing to govern-
ment accountability and discouraging corruption.15 “The media has a 
‘corrective’ function by bringing to the public’s attention corruption 
and inequitable practices.”16 This pervasive watchdog vision of the 
media is evident everywhere from the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights,17 to the World Bank’s focus on accountabil-
                                                                                                                     
 14. The OSCE’s policy regarding media standards is a rare explicit statement of the 
media’s role in democratic society: 
  A free and responsible media is an integral component of any democratic 
society. It ensures that the public is provided with unbiased and balanced 
information and is able to make informed decisions and form opinions on issues 
of crucial importance to Kosovo. A functioning democracy is characterized not 
only by free exchange of opinion and information between individual citizens, but 
also by free, independent and pluralistic mass media. In short, information 
received through professional and independent media fosters and encourages 
public engagement in political and economic life. 
OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Media Standards, supra note 8. 
 15. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Report on Civil and Political Rights Including the Question of: 
Freedom of Expression, Annex I, delivered to the Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/63 (Jan. 18, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Report of the Special Rapporteur] (joint 
statement by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion & Expression, the Repre-
sentative on Freedom of the Media of the OSCE, and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Free-
dom of Expression); Declaration on Freedom of Political Debate in the Media, supra note 
10, at pmbl. (noting that the media is important in order to “exercise public scrutiny over 
public and political affairs, as well as for ensuring accountability and transparency of po-
litical bodies and public authorities”); Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom 
of Expression, supra note 10 (recognizing the benefits of increased transparency and ac-
countability of government actions as a result of the free flow of information); United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Capacity Building, 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=19487&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2008) [hereinafter UNESCO, Capacity Building] (noting that capac-
ity-building projects pay special attention to issues of governance “with the aim of improv-
ing information and service delivery, encouraging citizen participation in the decision-
making process and making government more accountable, transparent and effective”). 
 16. 2000 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, at Annex I. 
 17. That tribunal noted that if the confidentiality of reporters’ sources was not pro-
tected, “the vital public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of 
the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.” Goodwin 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17488/90, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 143 (1996). 
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ity, transparency, and anticorruption,18 to the work of NGOs such as 
Freedom House, which annually measures press freedom around 
the world.19  
 In addition to its watchdog function, the press also must create a 
space for public debate.20 In facilitating this public debate, a free 
press enables the operation of the marketplace of ideas, ensuring 
that multiple viewpoints on issues of public concern are represented. 
If the media ably performs this public debate function, the result is a 
well-informed citizenry that is capable of participation and self-
governance. The press itself, as well as other institutions, sees this 
not just as an ability to disseminate information about matters of 
public interest; rather, it is a responsibility. The public has a right to 
receive this information, and it is the responsibility of the media to 
provide it.21 But the effect of the media’s creation of this public 
sphere is broader than simply the dissemination of information to a 
passive public that then goes to the polls and votes on the basis of the 
opinions formed through reading media accounts of the events of the 
day. A successful free press encourages participation from the public 
at large, fostering a robust civil society capable of carrying on the de-
bate inspired initially by the media, creating a true marketplace of 
ideas where all points of view are represented.  
                                                                                                                      
 18. World Bank, Dev. Comm., Strengthening Bank Group Engagement on Governance 
and Anticorruption, at ii, DC2006-0017 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at. 
http://worldbank.org/html/extdr/comments/governancefeedback/gacpaper.pdf; Daniel 
Kaufmann, World Bank, Keynote Presentation at the Int’l Press Freedom Conference, Me-
dia, Governance, and Development: An Empirical Perspective that Challenges Convention, 
(May 3, 2006) (synthesis draft of presentation), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/press_freedom_day_keynote.pdf; Press Re-
lease, World Bank, Free and Independent Media Empower the Poor and Spur Develop-
ment (Nov. 20, 2002) [hereinafter World Bank Press Release] (“Free and independent me-
dia can expose corruption in government and the corporate sector, provide a voice for the 
people/citizens to be heard, and help build public consensus to bring about change . . . .”). 
As the Bank points out, journalists not only can offer disclosures about government activ-
ity but also can provoke debate about solutions to address the problems that they have un-
covered. Id. 
 19. Freedom House’s measures rely, in part, on whether journalists are free to criti-
cize the state, whether they are given access to government information, whether the gov-
ernment interferes with the content of the news and information emanating from media 
outlets, and whether there is government-imposed or self-censorship. FREEDOM HOUSE, 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: METHODOLOGY (2006), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template. 
cfm?page=350&ana_page=102&year=2006. 
 20. See, e.g., Declaration on Freedom of Political Debate in the Media, supra note 10, 
at III; OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Media Standards, supra note 8.  
 21. E.g., Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1992) (stating that it 
is incumbent on the press to deliver information and ideas on matters pertaining to the 
public interest); REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS & UNESCO, PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
JOURNALISTS 15 (1998) [hereinafter PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS] (reproducing the 
Declaration of Rights and Obligations of Journalists, known as the Munich Charter) (“All 
rights and duties of a journalist originate from this right of the public to be informed on 
events and opinions.”). 
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 This public debate role also contains within it a notion that multi-
ple and varied viewpoints on public issues will be represented in the 
press. This means not only that leaders will be permitted “to reflect 
and comment on the preoccupations of public opinion,”22 but that all 
elements of society will be permitted to participate in the debate. In 
fact, ideally, the press itself will be as varied as the opinions and 
points of view of the public it serves, because “the existence of a mul-
tiplicity of autonomous and independent media outlets at the na-
tional, regional and local levels generally enhances pluralism 
and democracy.”23  
 Finally, the media’s use of their right to free expression to facili-
tate public debate should promote tolerance and understanding 
among different elements of society.24 This role of the media is seen 
as especially crucial in conflict and post-conflict situations,25 where 
the institutions of civil society are important elements for reconcilia-
tion and for fair and effective democratic elections.26  
 In order for the media to fulfill these roles—as watchdog, as facili-
tator of public debate, and as promoter of pluralistic tolerance—there 
are certain characteristics that an ideal press should have, or stan-
dards by which it should operate. The most universally endorsed and 
fundamental of these ideal characteristics is that the media should 
be free and independent. Advocates for free expression and media 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 23 (1992). 
 23. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation on Measures to Promote 
Media Pluralism, No. R (99) 1, 656th Mtg., pmbl. (Jan. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Recommen-
dation on Measures to Promote Media Pluralism]; see also UNESCO, Capacity Building, 
supra note 15.  
 24. E.g., Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra 
note 10, at pmbl. (“[T]he right to freedom of expression is essential for the development of 
knowledge and understanding among peoples.”); Council of Eur., Steering Comm. on the 
Media and New Commc’ns Servs., Reply to the Committee of Ministers on the Alignment of 
Laws on Defamation with the Relevant Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Doc. No. CDMC(2006)028, ¶ 6 (Feb. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Alignment of Laws of Defama-
tion] (“Without open public debate there can be no pluralism, tolerance and broadminded-
ness which, in turn, are  preconditions for the existence of a democratic society.”).  
 25. E.g., Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Declaration on Freedom of Expression 
and Information in the Media in the Context of the Fight Against Terrorism, 917th Mtg., 
pmbl. (Mar. 2, 2005) (“[T]he free and unhindered dissemination of information and ideas is 
one of the most effective means of promoting understanding and tolerance, which can help 
prevent or combat terrorism.”); UNESCO, Media in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=18538&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2008) (“For several years now, UNESCO has been supporting 
independent media in conflict and post-conflict situations to enable them to gather and 
disseminate non-partisan information.”).  
 26. E.g., UNESCO, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press, 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=22597&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2008) [hereinafter UNESCO, Freedom of Expression] (“Freedom of 
the press, pluralism and independence of the media, development of community 
newspapers and radio stations are crucial to the re-establishment of social bonds and to 
the reconciliation process.”).  
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able to exercise that freedom effectively understand that to be a suc-
cessful watchdog and to determine the relevant topics of public de-
bate, the press must be able to pursue its own agenda. This means 
that no individual, group, or government entity should be able to in-
fluence which stories journalists choose to pursue or what informa-
tion and analysis those stories contain.27 Only a media free to inves-
tigate and report on the subjects of its own choosing can provide the 
citizenry in a participatory democracy with the information it needs 
to hold its government accountable and to engage fully and effec-
tively in debates on matters of public interest. The principle of inde-
pendence leads to certain standards governing the media environ-
ment which are necessary to ensure that the media is free to act in-
dependently. The first is a categorical rejection of government regu-
lation of or control over media content and an insistence that any 
regulation of the media sector must be through self-regulation from 
within the profession itself.28 Also widely endorsed are the protection  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Examples of the international community’s endorsement of independence as a de-
fining characteristic of the free press are legion. See, e.g., 2000 Report of the Special Rap-
porteur, supra note 15, at Annex 1; Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 17, delivered to the Comm’n on Hum. 
Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/40 (Jan. 28, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Report of the Special 
Rapporteur]; Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Information, supra note 10, at 
II(b); Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra note 10, at 
princ. 13; PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS, supra note 21, at 15-17; World Press 
Freedom Comm., Charter for a Free Press, princs. 1 & 2 (Jan. 18, 1987), available at 
http://www.wpfc.org/Fundamentals.html [hereinafter WPFC Charter]; World Bank Press 
Release, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 28. Perhaps the idea is embodied most strongly in the work of the World Press Free-
dom Committee (WPFC), an umbrella organization made up of dozens of journalistic 
groups that is dedicated to resisting attempts to regulate the press. See WPFC Charter, 
supra note 27. In pursuit of this aim, WPFC monitors UNESCO, the UN General Assem-
bly, the UN Commission on Human Rights, OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU, and any 
other international organization or meeting considering issues that might impinge on the 
free press. It then provides a unified, global platform through which the profession can 
combat any proposed restrictions that the media see as a threat to press freedom. See 
World Press Freedom Comm., About WPFC, http://www.wpfc.org/index.html (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2008). Resistance to media regulation is not confined, however, to the agenda of 
entities made up only of journalists. See, e.g., Kaufmann, supra note 18, at 1; UNESCO, 
Freedom of Expression, supra note 26. 
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of confidential sources,29 the physical protection of journalists,30 the  
 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Again, institutions both inside and outside the journalistic profession assert the 
importance of the norm that protects confidentiality of reporters’ sources. See Goodwin v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 17488/90, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 145-46 (1996); Prosecutor v. 
Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶¶ 35, 50 (Dec. 11, 
2002) (holding that a war correspondent must reveal his source only if the evidence sought 
is of direct and important value in determining a core issue in the case and that it cannot 
reasonably be obtained elsewhere); 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶ 
17 (“Without such protection for both journalists and sources, the media’s access to infor-
mation and their ability to communicate that information to the public are likely to be 
compromised.”); Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Fourth Eur. Ministerial Conf. on 
Mass Media Policy, Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, Res. No. 2, princ. 3 (1994), 
available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Events/2002-09-Media/ConfMedia1994.asp 
(declaring that protecting confidentiality of sources “enables journalism to contribute to 
the maintenance and development of genuine democracy”); Council of Eur., Comm. of Min-
isters, Recommendation on the Right of Journalists Not to Disclose Their Sources of Infor-
mation, No. R (2000) 7, 701th Mtg, pmbl. (Mar. 8, 2000) (“[T]he protection of journalists’ 
sources of information constitutes a basic condition for journalistic work and freedom as 
well as for the freedom of the media.”); Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Free-
dom of Expression, supra note 10, at princ. 8 (“Every social communicator has the right to 
keep his/her source of information, notes, personal and professional archives confiden-
tial.”); PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS, supra note 21, at 15-17 (reproducing the Mu-
nich Charter); Nina Kraut, A Critical Analysis of One Aspect of Randal in Light of Interna-
tional, European, and American Human Rights Conventions and Case Law, 35 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 337, 341-43 (2004) (arguing that the principles in Brdjanin apply to all 
journalists, not just war correspondents); Diego Bivero-Volpe, Journalistic Privilege: A 
Democratic Pillar, GREATREPORTER.COM, June 7, 2006, 
http://greatreporter.com/mambo/content/view/1256/9/; Press Release, Reporters Without 
Borders, Court of Appeals Upholds Jail Sentence for Two Journalists Who Protected Their 
Sources (Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12565 (ex-
pressing deep concern over a U.S. Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold a sentence of jail 
time for reporters held in contempt for refusing to reveal their sources).  
 30. The norm regarding physical protection of journalists is robust. In fact, over the 
years, there have been several attempts to formulate a convention on the protection of 
journalists; however, none of these attempts has resulted in the adoption of a convention. 
Jennifer Lee, Peace and the Press: Media Rules During U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 30 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 135, 157-60 (1997); Dylan Howard, Note, Remaking the Pen Might-
ier Than the Sword: An Evaluation of the Growing Need for the International Protection of 
Journalists, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 505, 510-23 (2002) (discussing the history and pro-
gression of violence against journalists); see Amit Mukherjee, International Protection of 
Journalists: Problem, Practice, and Prospects, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339, 346-53 
(1994) [hereinafter Mukherjee, International Protection of Journalists]; see generally Amit 
Mukherjee, The Internationalization of Journalists’ “Rights”: An Historical Analysis, 4 J. 
INT’L L. & PRAC. 87 (1995). There are, however, several formal international treaties that 
protect journalists’ bodily integrity. According to the Geneva Conventions, journalists who 
accompany the armed forces and are wounded or sick in an area of conflict are entitled to 
all the protections afforded to wounded or sick combatants and to prisoners of war. Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 13(4), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea art. 13(4), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(4), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. And the First Optional Protocol to the Conventions, adopted 
in 1977, reclassified journalists as civilians, so that reporters who differentiate themselves 
from members of the armed forces are entitled to all of the protections offered to civilians. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
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prevention of the abuse of defamation claims to harass reporters and 
editors,31 and liberal access to information policies.32 
                                                                                                                     
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 79, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
The U.S. is not a party to the optional protocol, but many of its provisions are considered 
customary international law. And of course there are the human rights treaties prohibiting 
torture, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/51 (Dec.10, 
1984), and arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, Banjul Charter, supra note 9, art. 4; 
American Convention, supra note 9, art 4; ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 6; European Conven-
tion, supra note 9, art. 2. These treaties apply to journalists as they apply to all people.  
 Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations also focus on protection of 
journalists’ physical safety. See Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of 
Expression, supra note 10, at princ. 9; Jo M. Pasqualucci, Criminal Defamation and the 
Evolution of the Doctrine of Freedom of Expression in International Law: Comparative Ju-
risprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 
420 (2006). The Council of Europe similarly condemns “killings, disappearances and other 
attacks on journalists” and “reaffirms the commitments of governments of member states 
to respect these existing guarantees for the protection of journalists,” such as the guaran-
tees under international humanitarian law, the European Convention, and other human 
rights instruments. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Declaration on the Protection of 
Journalists in Situations of Conflict and Tension, 98th Sess., ¶ (May 3, 1996). see also 
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF MEDIA INDEPENDENCE 
(2006); INT’L PRESS INST., WORLD PRESS FREEDOM REVIEW (2006), available at 
http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom.html; REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, 
WORLDWIDE PRESS FREEDOM INDEX (2006); Comm. to Protect Journalists, Journalists 
Killed: Statistics & Background, http://cpj.org/deadly/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 
2008); Comm. to Protect Journalists, Journalists Missing, 
http://cpj.org/Briefings/missing_list.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2008); UNESCO, World 
Press Freedom Day 2007, http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=22728&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Aug. 25, 
2008); WPFC Charter, supra note 27, at princ. 10.  
 31. For example, most international and transnational institutions agree that crimi-
nal penalties for defamation are inappropriate. E.g., MONICA MACOVEI, FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 52 (2d ed. 2004) (distributed by the Council of Europe); 
Pasqualucci, supra note 30, at 393; see also Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of 
Expression and Opinion, Report on Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of 
Freedom of Expression, ¶ 36, delivered to the Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/67 (Dec. 30, 2002) (“[T]he sentencing to a prison term for libel or defamation 
is clearly not a proportionate penalty . . . .”); 2000 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra 
note 15, ¶ 52 (“Criminal defamation laws should be repealed in favour of civil laws . . . .”); 
Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra note 10, at princ. 
10; Alignment of Laws on Defamation, supra note 24, ¶ 20; ARTICLE 19, DEFINING 
DEFAMATION: PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PROTECTION OF REPUTATION 7 
(2000), available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/definingdefamation.pdf (“All 
criminal defamation laws should be abolished and replaced, where necessary, with appro-
priate civil defamation laws.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA: 2005 
WORLD REPORT 6, 11, 33-34 (2005); Darian Pavli, The Cost of Speech: Violations of Media 
Freedom in Albania, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 2002, at 29 (“Human Rights Watch op-
poses, generally and as a matter of principle, all laws that make defamation a criminal of-
fense.”); Press Release, Int’l Press Inst., Resolution on Criminal Defamation and Insult 
Laws (May 18, 2004) (“The view that the criminalisation of defamation is illegitimate is 
shared by the world’s leading courts such as the European Court of Human Rights, the In-
ter-American Human Rights Commission and the US Supreme Court. The clear trend of 
their opinions is that defamation (libel and slander) should be treated under civil law, to be 
adjudicated between the parties by civil courts not as criminal offences subject to 
state punishments.”).  
830  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:817 
 
 Closely related to the idea of independence is the principle of me-
dia professionalism. While media independence requires govern-
ments and other powerful actors to refrain from attempting to influ-
ence media content, professionalism is a set of standards to which 
members of the media themselves must be held. These standards are 
embodied in the ethical codes of the profession, which require that 
journalists work in the public interest and that editorial decisions 
are not influenced by improper motivations. In fact, journalists’ pro-
fessional codes maintain that because the rights and duties of jour-
nalists originate from the right of the public to be informed, journal-
ists’ primary obligation is to the public.33 This obligation exceeds any 
other responsibility, especially to the journalist’s employer or to gov-
ernment authorities. Thus, journalists’ view of their role in democ-
ratic society is consistent with the role conceived for them by others: 
a conduit of unbiased information about issues of public concern en-
suring that the citizenry is able to form rational opinions and policy 
preferences. Media professionalism includes the duties to respect the 
                                                                                                                     
 In addition, speech critical of the government or government officials, in and of itself, 
should not be considered defamatory. See Jerusalem v. Austria, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, 
82-83 (2001); Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1992); Observer and 
Guardian v. United Kingdom, 216 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1992); Thorgeirson v. Ice-
land, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1992); Oberschlick v. Austria, 204 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at 26 (1991); Lingens v. Austria, 1986 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 170, 171 (Eur. Ct. of 
H.R.); Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, (Jul. 2, 2004); 2000 
Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, ¶ 52 (“Government bodies and public au-
thorities should not be able to bring defamation suits . . . .”); Declaration on Freedom of Po-
litical Debate in the Media, supra note 10; Inter-American Declaration of Principles on 
Freedom of Expression, supra note 10, at princ. 11 (stating that “[l]aws that penalize offen-
sive expressions directed at public officials” are impermissible infringements on free ex-
pression and the right to information); Alignment of Laws on Defamation, supra note 24, 
¶¶ 12-13, 22-23; MACOVEI, supra, at 34-35; PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS, supra note 
21, at 15 (“The journalists’ responsibility towards the public excels any other responsibility, 
particularly towards employers and public authorities.”); Pasqualucci, supra note 30, 
at 399-400. 
 32. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶ 19 (“The policy is in-
tended ‘to ensure that information concerning UNDP operational activities will be made 
available to the public in the absence of a compelling reason for confidentiality.’ ” (empha-
sis omitted)); PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS, supra note 21, at 17 (“Journalists claim 
free access to all information . . . . Therefore, secrecy of the public or private affairs may be 
opposed only to journalists in exceptional cases and for clearly expressed motives.”); 
WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 2 (2002); Kauf-
mann, supra note 18, at 3; Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Survey Methodology, at 
A(5) http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/2007/fopmethod2007.pdf (last visited Aug. 
25, 2008) (“Is freedom of information legislation in place and are journalists able to make 
use of it?”); Reporters Without Borders, Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2006: Question-
naire, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19390 (last visited Aug. 25, 2008); 
UNESCO, Access to Information, http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=19488&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Aug. 
25, 2008).  
 33. PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS, supra note 21, at 15; Leslie Gelb, President, 
Council of Foreign Relations, Introduction at Journalists Covering Conflict: Norms of Con-
duct Conference (Apr. 28, 1999).  
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truth; to report facts accurately and evenhandedly; to refrain from 
using unfair methods to obtain information; to respect privacy; to 
avoid engaging in plagiarism, slander, libel, unfounded accusations, 
or propaganda; and to ignore efforts of others intended to affect the 
content of news.34  
 Finally, the press should be pluralistic, meaning that it should be 
representative of multiple sectors of society and should provide cul-
turally diverse content such that it reflects all views on major socie-
tal issues.35 This pluralism has structural elements, meaning that 
there should be multiple independent and autonomous media outlets 
as well as a content elements, meaning that those media outlets 
should provide diverse content and viewpoints. A pluralist press is 
the best means of ensuring a well-informed citizenry that is fully 
prepared to participate in governance, because it is the most likely to 
disseminate the entire spectrum of views and ideas about any par-
ticular issue. As an institution able to convey information from var-
ied viewpoints to all members of society, a pluralist press is also seen 
as a means of fostering tolerance and understanding across divisions 
within a particular society. The drive for media pluralism thus stems 
from the determination that it is both a prerequisite for and a major 
factor in successful democratization, especially in a pluralist society. 
 These norms are not binding law. They are simply the standards 
and expectations that are reflected repeatedly and consistently in the 
pronouncements, policies, and agendas of intergovernmental organi-
zations, NGOs, and national domestic governments devoted to liberal 
democratic principles. As such, they have become informal aspira-
tional guidelines for an ideal media sector. And despite their non-
binding nature, they are fiercely guarded; any action that conflicts 
with them is guaranteed to provoke strong criticism.36 
 
                                                                                                                     
 34. PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS, supra note 21, at 16. 
 35. 2000 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, at Annex I;, Recommenda-
tion on Measures to Promote Media Pluralism, supra note 23, app. at I; Declaration on 
Freedom of Expression and Information, supra note 10, ¶ 6; see, e.g., Monroe E. Price, Re-
structuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives, The Experience of Inter-
governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 1, 7, 12 (2000) (explaining that OSCE saw a stronger multi-ethnic media voice as a 
key element in overcoming the nationalistic and separatist political atmosphere that pre-
vailed in post-conflict Bosnia); Kaufmann, supra note 18, at 3; UNESCO, Content Devel-
opment, http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=19486&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL 
_SECTION=201.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).  
 36. “[T]his liberal agenda has tended to drive media policy. An open media is seen as 
a ‘good thing,’ and has been promoted even in somewhat extreme circumstances . . . .” Tim 
Allen & Nicole Stremlau, Media Policy, Peace and State Reconstruction 2 (LSE Crisis 
States Research Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 8, 2005). “[W]hen it comes to war zones, the 
‘received wisdom’ seems to be that the best way to counter divisive speech is to allow for 
more speech . . . rather than to impose restrictions.” Id. at 3. 
832  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:817 
 
B.   THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
 In a democracy, an ideal press—one able to carry out its functions 
of facilitating the effective exercise of free expression—must be free 
and independent, must be able to resist external pressures that 
might affect editorial decisions, must be committed to an ethical code 
that insists on placing the public interest ahead of any political 
agenda, and must be pluralist. These ideals are important, and they 
are effective in situations where their application is justified. They 
are not, however, universally applicable. In fact, there are some con-
texts that provide compelling reasons to depart from them in signifi-
cant ways. 
 When it comes to addressing the role of accepted media norms, the 
lion’s share of the post hoc analysis of the media reform efforts un-
dertaken in Bosnia and Kosovo focuses on the wrong question. These 
analyses, almost without exception, ask whether the media regula-
tion schemes implemented by international reformers were consis-
tent with international human rights and free expression stan-
dards.37 This Article argues for a substantial reframing of the ques-
tion. Rather than wondering whether international reformers acted 
within the confines of the media norms that apply to established de-
mocracies, we should be asking how the specific facts and circum-
stances encountered in these democratization contexts might justify 
modifying, suspending, or possibly even discarding—on a temporary 
basis—strict adherence to the widely accepted norms outlined above.  
 To accept that this question is the relevant one, we must under-
stand first that democracy and democratization are not one and the 
same. This proposition is not new or radical. In fact, the well-
established field of democratization studies takes it entirely for 
granted,38 and with good reason. After all, by definition, in any place 
where a transition to democracy is taking place, full-fledged democ-
racy does not yet exist. The norms that have developed in the context 
of established democracies rely for their success on many of the char-
acteristics of democratic society—stable rule of law, a society-wide 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Peter Krug & Monroe E. Price, A Module for Media Intervention: Content Regula-
tion in Post-Conflict Zones, in FORGING PEACE: INTERVENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF MEDIA SPACE 148, 148 (Monroe E. Price & Mark Thompson eds., 2002); 
Julie Mertus & Mark Thompson, The Learning Curve: Media Development in Kosovo, in 
FORGING PEACE: INTERVENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF MEDIA SPACE 
259, 280 (Monroe E. Price & Mark Thompson eds., 2002). 
 38. E.g., LAURENCE WHITEHEAD, DEMOCRATIZATION: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 7-35 
(2002) (treating as separate inquiries what is meant by democracy—the end goal of democ-
ratization—and what is meant by democratization—the process by which a political entity 
moves toward democratic governance).  
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political identity, political contestation through nonviolent means, 
and so on.39 
 Because democracy does not yet exist in places undergoing democ-
ratization, and therefore the democratic characteristics presupposed 
by established standards may not yet exist, we should not assume 
that the norms guiding the understanding and treatment of institu-
tions in democracies apply.40  
 Within this field of study, there is some contestation over how 
best to define the word “democratization.” One point of view sees de-
mocratization as the transition from political monopoly to political 
competition. In this view, democratization processes are simply those 
institutional changes that successfully lead to the desired outcome—
political competition.41 The shortcoming of this view is that it does 
not fully capture the complexity and nuance of most contemporary 
democratizations; to encompass the entire field of study, a more ex-
pansive definition is necessary.42 An alternative view, and the one 
which this Article adopts, is that “[d]emocratization is best under-
stood as a complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended process.”43 It 
is a process that is unpredictable, in that neither participants nor 
experts will be able to anticipate how it will proceed, how long it will 
take, who will be the winners or losers, and which pre-transition 
conditions will significantly affect how it unfolds. On this view, the 
democratization process is not complete simply because elections 
have been held. Instead, it continues until a more broad-based trans-
formation of society as a whole has taken place, and it is complete 
only when a culture of public debate and civil disputation has re-
placed the pre-transition means of settling political questions.  
 This view of democratization as an unpredictable, long-term, dy-
namic process has some important implications. First, there can be 
no formula or set of actions that, when taken, will ensure successful 
democratization wherever they are competently implemented. In-
stead, the context in which the transition is taking place is enor-
mously important. Democratization tactics must be tailored to the 
historical, political, economic, military and other relevant factors 
that exist on the ground. “[I]nstitutional design for new democracies 
needs to be seen as an exercise in social construction and persuasion, 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See Allen & Stremlau, supra note 36, at 4 (“[T]he starting point here is the bene-
fits of the media at ‘optimal performance’ – i.e. in rich democracies. . . . [P]roponents of free 
expression are deeply reluctant to concede situations where restricting the media may be 
appropriate except in the most blatant or dire of circumstances.”). 
 40. It should be noted that while this statement may well hold true for the treatment 
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 42. Id. at 28. 
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rather than in terms of the importation of internationally approved 
and standardized ‘right’ answers . . . .”44 Second, the process will take 
place in stages. In the early phases of a transition, reformers will 
have to focus their efforts on certain types of reforms—such as put-
ting an end to violent conflict—which ultimately will become less 
crucial at later stages. And similarly, measures that would be inap-
propriate or doomed to failure in the early stages might become both 
more feasible and more desirable over time as the process unfolds.  
 In democratization contexts, partial deviation from strict adher-
ence to democratic norms might be justified based on certain condi-
tions that often prevail in transitional societies. Indeed, some of 
these conditions render such deviations not only justified but neces-
sary for successful transition. The first is the existence of deep social 
cleavages along ethnic, regional, religious, linguistic, or racial lines, 
especially when these cleavages have been the basis for violent con-
flict.45 In these deeply divided societies, large segments of the society 
are susceptible to co-option and control by nondemocratic networks 
or power bases held over from the pre-transition regime. Moreover, 
the uncertainties accompanying major political transitions often can 
reinforce group identities and loyalties and therefore exacerbate con-
flicts between groups. As a result, divided societies present signifi-
cant barriers to the development of a national consciousness as well 
as increased risk of intersocietal tensions and even violence. These 
characteristics pose challenges to successful democratic governance 
that are absent in established democracies and which must be over-
come by reform efforts during the transitional period.  
 Not only are transitional societies often deeply divided, they also 
often have recently emerged from conflict. This post-conflict state of 
affairs is relevant to democratization in several ways. First of all, es-
pecially when post-conflict societies are also deeply divided, the pre-
existing divisions or lingering disputes unresolved by the recently 
ended conflict often remain just below the surface. Renewed violence 
and the breakdown of peace agreements or truces may be sparked by 
events that, in a firmly established democracy, would pose no threat 
to the peace. Moreover, post-conflict societies often exhibit nascent 
and fragile commitment to the rule of law and institutions meant to 
support the rule of law. Inexperienced, untrustworthy, or over-
whelmed police forces, courts, and government agencies cannot be re-
lied upon to inspire the confidence among the citizenry that is neces-
sary for stability. The heightened tensions, fragile institutions, and 
constant risk of renewed violence present in post-conflict transitions 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 112. 
 45. See id. at 76-77 (pointing out that deep divisions can form obstacles to the devel-
opment of healthy civil society). 
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must be taken into account in crafting any transitional process 
meant to lead to peaceful coexistence and meaningful reconciliation.  
 Finally, transitional societies lack the entrenched tradition of de-
mocratic norms and commitment to resolving political disputes 
through civil, public debate that prevails in stable democracies.46 
This dearth of democratic tradition often includes the absence of a 
tradition of free and independent media. Instead of operating as part 
of a robust civil society where the actors are independent of inappro-
priate influence and committed to acting within the legal rules,47 the 
media in societies emerging from authoritarian or other nondemoc-
ratic rule often have a tradition of being tools of propaganda and 
mouthpieces for particular political agendas. Because the media in 
such places have never developed a sense of their role as instruments 
of the public interest—committed to independence, accuracy, and 
evenhandedness—reforms designed to create such media will have to 
instill in journalists an entirely new ethic. Such a fundamental shift 
in ethos is never easily accomplished. 
 Each of these characteristics also has concrete effects on the me-
dia environment. In such circumstances, the typical, liberal market-
place of ideas hypothesis—the idea that the cure for inaccurate, of-
fensive, or simply unconvincing speech is more speech, rather than 
regulation—simply may not hold true. Because of the deep divisions, 
more speech may result in heightened tensions. And when such ten-
sions are heightened in a post-conflict circumstance, the risk of re-
newed violence therefore may be raised, rather than eased, by a pro-
liferation of media output. Similarly, the marketplace of ideas relies 
on a plural media, one where a point/counterpoint discussion can 
take place and where opposing viewpoints engage in civil debate. But 
in a divided society, where each sector listens only to one or a few 
dominant voices that share the perspective of a majority of that sec-
tor’s citizenry, and where contrary viewpoints have no outlet for ex-
pression or are subjected to intimidation, the usual justification for 
avoiding any content regulation may not bear out. 
 A society governed by accepted democratic norms and principles is 
the ultimate goal. And in an ideal world, at the end of the long and 
complex process that is democratization, such a society will emerge. 
As the foregoing discussion has shown, however, transitional socie-
ties differ from established democracies in important ways—ways 
that affect the way we should think about designing media democra-
tization policies. And so while democratic norms remain an impor-
tant touchstone, recognizing these differences may at times indicate 
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that the best ways of accomplishing the ultimate goal is through 
means of democratization that depart from principles proscribed by 
democratic norms. 
III.   THE CASES OF BOSNIA & KOSOVO 
 First, this Part will describe the political contexts in Bosnia and 
Kosovo that are relevant to the project of media reform undertaken 
there. It then will discuss those reform efforts, pointing out the ways 
in which the transitional nature of the circumstances impeded their 
success, explaining how established democratic media norms were 
invoked to undermine measures that actually were necessary, and 
suggesting ways in which such impediments might have been 
avoided or minimized.  
A.   POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 The efforts by intergovernmental agencies and organizations in an 
attempt to facilitate a transition to democracy in Bosnia following its 
civil war and in Kosovo after the war between the Serbian central 
government and the province of Kosovo’s Albanian population pre-
sent two cases that allow us to consider some of the difficult ques-
tions posed by democratization in the field of media reform. Both of 
these post-conflict situations involved deeply divided societies where 
renewed violence among ethnic groups remained a very real threat. 
And in both places, the media historically had been used by political 
factions as propaganda tools to highlight and exacerbate the tensions 
that ultimately led to war. In short, they both exhibited characteris-
tics which not only justified departure from the standards at work in 
established democracies, but also ensured that any successful media 
reform effort would have to do so. This Part sets out the relevant po-
litical circumstances and media sector characteristics with which the 
international regulators were faced when they began their democra-
tization missions in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
1.   Bosnia 
 When Bosnia emerged from civil war with the signing of the Gen-
eral Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Dayton Accords or Accords)48 in 1995, the organized violence 
stopped, but the ethnic divisions and tensions that had fueled the 
war remained. The Accords created a nation divided along ethnic 
lines into two semiautonomous entities, the Bosniac Muslim-Croat 
Federation—a federation of territories controlled by the Bosnian 
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Muslims and Croats respectively—and the Serbian Republic, popu-
lated largely by Bosnian Serbs.49 Politically, very few issues were to 
be decided at the national level, but instead power devolved largely 
to the entity or local level.50 Despite this decentralized power struc-
ture and its concomitant ethnic divisions and tensions, the organiza-
tions and administrators charged with implementing the Dayton Ac-
cords aimed to facilitate the development of a unified, multiethnic 
Bosnian national identity.51 
 Bosnia’s geographic and ethnic divisions were reflected in its pub-
lic sphere, where both political parties and media outlets tended to 
align themselves with particular ethnicities. The federated structure 
of post-war Bosnia and the power-sharing devices employed in that 
structure ensured that political leaders within each ethnic commu-
nity would have a great deal of power.52 Consequently, the leaders of 
these ethnic communities had a great deal to gain by consolidating 
power within their respective ethnic enclaves and to resist efforts to 
create a unified Bosnian identity that might spread power among 
ethnic groups. Their strategy for doing so was to continue to view po-
litical issues through ethnic lenses and to continue to support the na-
tionalist, separatist position that they had advocated during the 
war.53 By contrast, the international community charged with over-
seeing the implementation of the Dayton framework was intent on 
forging a unified Bosnia, a project that required the breakdown of old 
power structures and the empowerment of a new generation of lead-
ers who did not share the war-time leaders’ ethnocentric agendas. 
 A significant factor contributing to the divided nature of post-war 
Bosnia was the nature of its media, and in particular its broadcast 
media. Both before and during the war, the seeds of the post-conflict 
media shortcomings were apparent, as the media—like the rest of 
the country—were divided along national or ethnic lines.54 This divi-
sion remained as Bosnia moved into its post-conflict transitional 
phase. Each ethnic group had a corresponding broadcast network. 
These networks, Serb Radio and Television (SRT), Croatian Radio 
and Television (HRT), and Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio and Television 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Dayton Accords, supra note 48, at 76; GARY T. DEMPSEY & ROGER W. FONTAINE, 
FOOL’S ERRANDS: AMERICA’S RECENT ENCOUNTERS WITH NATION BUILDING 86 (2001).  
 50. Shelley Inglis, Re/Constructing Right(s): The Dayton Peace Agreement, Interna-
tional Civil Society Development, and Gender in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 78-79 (1998); Fred L. Morrison, The Constitution of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 145, 145 (1996). 
 51. DEMPSEY & FONTAINE, supra note 49, at 85; Price, supra note 35, at 6.  
 52. See Inglis, supra note 50, at 84; Morrison, supra note 50, at 145. 
 53. Price, supra note 35, at 6. 
 54. MARK THOMPSON, SLOVENIA, CROATIA, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, MACEDONIA 
(FYROM) AND KOSOVO: INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO MEDIA 32 (2000); see Price, supra 
note 35, at 5. 
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(RTBiH), were broadcast in the territory where a particular ethnic 
group was concentrated and served as the major source of informa-
tion within that area.55 This dynamic resulted in the creation of es-
sentially three audiences, with no national networks reaching the en-
tirety of the Bosnian population. The networks tended to be aligned 
with local politicians.56 Sometimes this meant that the political par-
ties themselves controlled the networks; sometimes it meant that 
journalists and editors were intimidated, through harassment, 
physical assaults, or threats, into broadcasting only reports of which 
those local leaders approved.57 Rather than engaging in independent, 
unbiased reporting, these networks not only supported the leader in 
power but also showed a penchant for polemical, nationalist state-
ments that demonized rival ethnic groups.58 Thus, the post-war me-
dia remained both politically aligned with entrenched ethnic leaders 
and prone to venomous, ethnically-biased, often inaccurate or unsup-
ported reports. 
 It was into this post-conflict morass that the international com-
munity waded, attempting to ensure the implementation of the terms 
of the Dayton Accords.59 Dayton itself contained no specific provisions 
for media reform.60 It did, however, provide that the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would organize elec-
tions,61 and OSCE officials knew that, absent reform of the existing 
media situation, voters would receive information only from the par-
tisan, nationalistic, divisive programming that existed in the imme-
diate aftermath of the war. With this type of program as the domi-
nant source of information, the likelihood of realizing the goal of the 
development of a unified Bosnian national identity was slim. In such 
an environment it was apparent that any election simply would re-
sult in the same nationalist leaders that led the country to war being 
voted into office.62 Such a result would entrench the existing ethnic 
                                                                                                                     
 55. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 36; Price, supra note 35, at 6.  
 56. See Price, supra note 35, at 6. 
 57. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 36; Price, supra note 35, at 5.   
 58. See THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 41. 
 59. In addition to the local political leaders in Bosnia, several international entities 
were put in place to ensure the implementation of Dayton’s provisions. A NATO-led multi-
national Implementation Force (IFOR), later know as the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), was 
responsible for the military aspects of the implementation. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 
34. The civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords were to be overseen by the Office of the High 
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Implementation Conference and approved by the United Nations Security Council. Dayton 
Accords, supra note 48, at annex 10, art. I. And the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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the judicial system. See S.C. Res. 1031, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (Dec. 15, 1995). 
 60. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 33. 
 61. Dayton Accords, supra note 48, at annex 3, art. II; THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 
34; Price, supra note 35, at 6. 
 62. Price, supra note 35, at 7. 
2008]  DEMOCRATIZING THE MEDIA 839 
 
divisions, endangering the long-term implementation of Dayton and 
jeopardizing the international community’s goal of a unified Bosnia. 
Thus, OSCE and the Office of the High Representative for the Im-
plementation of the Peace Agreement (OHR), the office charged with 
overseeing the civilian aspects of implementing the Dayton frame-
work, made media reform a significant element of both election 
preparations and the broader implementation of Dayton.  
 OSCE and OHR’s reform efforts almost universally failed to rec-
ognize the implications of the context in which they were imple-
mented. The reforms were aimed at transforming the Bosnian media 
sector into one that conformed to the model developed in western 
democracies outlined above. Specifically, some reforms focused on 
making the local media pluralist, both in the sense of ensuring that it 
reached all segments of Bosnian society and also that its content pre-
sented varied points of view on salient issues. The hope was that 
such information would send unifying, mediating messages aimed at 
conflict resolution to the Bosnian population as a whole. Other re-
forms were targeted at the way journalists do their jobs, trying to 
shape the Bosnian media into the western image of a free press that 
is independent from political or other improper influence and that 
conforms to standards of professional conduct with respect to charac-
teristics such as accuracy and evenhandedness. But none of them 
sufficiently accounted for the effects of Bosnia’s continued ethnic di-
visions. Nor did they consider the extent of the difficulties posed by 
the lack of a tradition or history of independent journalism.  
2.   Kosovo 
 When NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign brought an end to the war 
between Serbia and the province of Kosovo’s Albanian population, 
the political and media environment had many similarities with the 
post-conflict scenario in Bosnia. For example, despite the formal end 
of hostilities, the political situation and the public sphere in Kosovo 
remained highly polarized. In fact, the threat of renewed large-scale 
violence in Kosovo was even more pronounced than it was in Bosnia. 
In contrast to Bosnia, where the parties signed a peace treaty (albeit 
under some duress) concluding hostilities and agreeing to a frame-
work for peace going forward, the conflict in Kosovo ended with a UN 
resolution,63 leaving the final status of Kosovo undetermined and a 
UN mission in charge of a territory full of Albanians and Serbs still 
intent on seeking revenge for the perceived wrongs done to them 
prior to and during the war.64 Interethnic harassment, intimidation, 
                                                                                                                     
 63. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
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and violence continued after the war’s end, and attacks on members 
of the Serb community, an ethnic minority within Kosovo, in retalia-
tion for past Serbian oppression of Kosovar Albanians were not un-
common.65 Polarization was not limited to the relationship between 
Kosovar Albanians and Serbs. Rival Kosovar Albanian political par-
ties were also vying for a piece of the post-conflict pie, though these 
intra-ethnic struggles tended to play out in peaceful, though polemi-
cal, fashion.66 
 Also as in Bosnia, the media traditionally had not been a neutral 
or conciliatory force. Albanian-Serbian tensions had built up over 
many years prior to the initial outbreak of violence.67 As tensions in-
tensified, the Serbian regime had become more aggressive in inter-
fering with Kosovo’s independent media outlets as a means of assert-
ing control over the formerly semiautonomous territory. For example, 
in 1990, Radio Television Pristina (RTP), Kosovo’s Albanian-
language broadcast entity, was taken over by the Serbian regime and 
transformed into a Serbian-language service.68 Albanian-language 
newspapers were generally permitted to continue to operate, but al-
ways under threat of harassment or closure.69 And the Albanian-
language newspapers that did exist tended to align themselves with 
one of the Albanian political factions extant in the province and 
served to inflame tensions, exaggerating both the scope of Serb 
abuses and the strength of pro-independence forces.70  
 Post-conflict Kosovo was a province with neither functional media 
nor functional government. During the war, the media outlets within 
Kosovo either had shut down entirely or removed their operations to 
a neighboring territory.71 Between Serbian leader Slobodan Mil-
                                                                                                                     
declared independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008. Dan Bilefsky, In a Showdown, 
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 65. See DEMPSEY & FONTAINE, supra note 49, at 135-36. The situation was so tense 
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 69. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 61. 
 70. Price, supra note 35, at 28-30. 
 71. See THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 61-62 (noting that Kosovo’s media was function-
ing in exile during NATO bombing); Price, supra note 35, at 27-28 (describing Serbian 
takeover of media in Kosovo); id. at 30 (noting that half of Kosovo’s population had fled and 
the other half had gone underground). 
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osevic’s crackdowns and the NATO bombing campaign, any indige-
nous, Albanian-language media that had existed prior to the war had 
been wiped out.72 When international forces moved into Kosovo after 
the NATO bombing ended, they found a province with no functional 
media, with most residents getting information from Albanian news-
papers and Albanian television via satellite. The media scene quickly 
became crowded, however, and mere months after the bombing 
ended, multiple daily newspapers, magazines, and radio stations had 
begun broadcasting and publishing. Yet the television landscape re-
mained barren.73 
 Politically, Kosovo was essentially made into a protectorate, and 
the United Nations was vested with the authority to administer the 
region through the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK), led by the Special Representative of the Secre-
tary-General (SRSG).74 Unlike Bosnia, where local politicians re-
tained authority to govern, UNMIK was the only governmental au-
thority in Kosovo until such time as elections could be held. 
UNMIK’s mandate called upon it to, inter alia, “[p]romot[e] the es-
tablishment . . . of substantial autonomy and self-government, . . . 
[p]erform[] basic civilian administrative functions,” and “promot[e] 
human rights,”75 while military and security issues would be gov-
erned by the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).76 While the interna-
tional community intended to restore Kosovo to the semiautonomous 
status it had enjoyed up until the early 1990s, it expressly avoided 
taking a position with respect to Kosovo’s final status—whether it 
eventually would become an independent entity as the Albanian 
population wanted or whether Serbia would retain control over it in 
some form.77 Despite the uncertainty of Kosovo’s final status, local 
political leaders retained significant influence in anticipation of UN-
run elections, which would allow some power to devolve back to local 
government. 
 Like the Dayton Accords that guided the administration of Bos-
nia’s post-conflict era, UNMIK’s mandate failed to include a specific 
media reform policy.78 But OSCE, again charged with democratiza-
tion and institution-building,79 considered media reform in Kosovo to 
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be an integral element of its institution-building program.80 And 
again, international reformers embarked on a plan based on the 
premise that “[i]n Kosovo, like in [Bosnia-Herzegovina], a profes-
sional and independent public service broadcasting service . . . [will] 
play a vital role in promoting reconciliation, peace, law and order and 
the establishment of a democratic civil society.”81 And again, the im-
plementation of reforms overlooked the political and media-related 
realities that should have influenced the design of reform efforts. 
B.   MEDIA REFORMS 
 In an attempt to foster the liberal democratic norms of independ-
ence, professionalism, and pluralism discussed above, and to remake 
the Bosnian and Kosovar media landscapes in the image of western 
free press, international administrators embarked on a variety of 
media reform efforts. These efforts met varying degrees of support 
within the international community at large, among influential me-
dia entities and organizations, and with local actors on the ground. 
Some of the reforms were destined to fail, some were necessary 
though controversial, and still others should have been more central 
to the overall media reform strategy. In the end, the international 
community’s failure to take into account the forces that would affect 
the effectiveness of their actions and to recognize that a departure 
from liberal democratic norms regarding the media that was, in some 
instances, crucial for bringing about media transition, rendered the 
efforts much less successful than they could have been.  
1.   Establishing National Networks 
 One element of media reform that was undertaken in both Bosnia 
and Kosovo was the attempt to establish a nationwide (or province-
wide, in the case of Kosovo) broadcast network that would be a 
source of reliable, unbiased information from a variety of sources—
both local and international—and that would be available through-
out the relevant geographic area.82 The impetus behind this reform 
effort was a desire to establish a pluralist media source—one that 
would broadcast multiple points of view—to combat the nationalistic, 
ethnocentric, or politically biased information characteristic of the 
established broadcast networks. By developing a nationwide source 
of reliable, unbiased information to the Bosnian populace, the inter-
national community hoped to combat the divisive, sectarian influ-
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ences of the ethnically affiliated SRT, HRT, and RTBiH and to en-
courage the development of national, non-ethnic based, democratic 
public opinion. While Kosovo was not burdened with a pre-existing 
chokehold on the broadcast media by ethnic or political influences, 
the idea of politically-affiliated media outlets was nonetheless inte-
gral to Kosovo’s media community. And, as in Bosnia, an impartial, 
province-wide broadcast network was envisioned as a tool for over-
coming the agenda-specific nature of Kosovo’s reporting, which re-
flected broader societal divisions deeply entrenched in the minds of 
both Albanians and Serbs.83 By providing pluralist information 
sources, reformers hoped to engender a civil society that encom-
passed the whole of the population and to ensure that the citizenry 
would have a forum for full and fair debate, free from improper po-
litical or ethnic influences.  
 Unfortunately, these efforts failed to recognize that the en-
trenched local political interests resulting from the divisions within 
Bosnian and Kosovar society had both the desire and the ability to 
place insurmountable obstacles in the way of these reforms unless 
international reformers were willing to utilize aggressive manage-
ment and oversight tactics. While locally controlled, autonomous na-
tional networks might be a valuable development at a later stage in 
the transition process, any attempt to establish them in the immedi-
ate post-conflict phase requires a level of regulatory control that re-
formers were loath to employ.  
 Recall that media pluralism, in the ideal model discussed above, 
incorporates both pluralism of media content—the idea that media 
sources should present varying views on the issues they cover—and 
pluralism of media outlets—the idea that there should be many 
sources of information in the media market. The norm favoring plu-
ralist media in general, and favoring the presentation of varied per-
spectives from each individual media entity in particular, is intended 
both to ensure the fullness of public debate on issues and to promote 
tolerance and understanding among various groups within society. 
The international reformers’ plan to establish nationwide networks 
was, in part, an attempt to ensure this pluralism of content.84 By cre-
ating a media outlet that was unbiased and impartial, which would 
cover issues from all angles without filtering it first through the lens 
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of any particular point of view, such networks would present varying 
views on relevant issues. This aspect of media pluralism, however, 
presupposes a society with a unified self-image. Different members of 
that society or different ethnic, socioeconomic, religious, or political 
elements might hold different views on what is best for that society 
and what policies should be implemented. But each of those factions 
considers itself part of the larger society; the relevant political entity 
is the entire nation. In other words, even though (as a general rule) 
Democrats might favor greater funding for entitlement programs 
while Republicans prefer lower taxes and less overall spending on 
such programs, all of these actors consider themselves Americans, 
and they advocate for their position by appealing to the whole of the 
American public. It is this shared understanding of belonging to the 
same national entity, despite philosophical or political differences, 
that allows the expression of and tolerance for multiple viewpoints. 
In other words, nationwide media pluralism presupposes a nation-
wide political consciousness. 
 This sense of commonality was, at best, an aspirational one in the 
deeply-divided societies present in both Bosnia and Kosovo at the 
time of the events described above. In Bosnia especially, and in Kos-
ovo to some degree as well, the very political structures that had 
been established recognized a sharply divided, self-consciously non-
pluralistic society. The Dayton Accords explicitly divided Bosnia into 
three ethnic enclaves, and the very existence of Kosovo as a semiau-
tonomous province is premised on the right to self-determination of 
ethnic Albanians living in Serbia. While the UN and OSCE’s stated 
goal in Bosnia was to forge a Bosnia-wide national consciousness, 
that goal seems at odds with the political settlement to which the 
parties on the ground agreed. Because Dayton created a dual-entity 
structure based on ethnicity and largely governed at the local level, 
local political leaders had nothing to gain by the development of me-
dia networks touting a unified Bosnia. Indeed, for local politicians, 
such networks were nothing but a threat to the existing power-
structures under which they thrived and prospered. So while the in-
ternational community’s long-term goal was for a unified, pluralist 
Bosnia, any policy implemented on the assumption that local actors 
shared that vision was woefully incongruent with the prevailing po-
litical conditions and therefore unlikely to succeed. 
 The situation in Kosovo was slightly more hopeful. Because there 
was no functional broadcast entity in existence when the UN took 
over governance of Kosovo, UNMIK and OSCE’s reform efforts did 
not have to overcome the influence of the sort of nationalist, biased 
networks with which they were faced in Bosnia. However, as in other 
Balkan power struggles, the media in Kosovo had been used by both 
Albanians and Serbs as means of waging their conflict since the early 
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1990s. And the very existence of Kosovo as a semiautonomous prov-
ince, premised on the right to self-determination of ethnic Albanians 
living in Serbia, embedded this ethnic conflict in the political reality 
on the ground. 
 In failing to recognize that the necessary element of a shared 
sense of community required for a successful nationwide media was 
absent, the international reformers overlooked crucial aspects of the 
context in which they were working, both in Bosnia and in Kosovo, 
which undermined their efforts to import western media pluralism 
into those territories. Specifically, they did not take into account the 
extent to which the extant societal divisions incentivized local lead-
ers and power-brokers to undermine international efforts toward 
media pluralism. Without appreciating the strength and pervasive-
ness of the resistance they were likely to face, the reformers failed to 
incorporate into their project sufficient independent oversight. As a 
result, the countervailing forces at work were powerful enough to 
render their efforts at creating pluralist media outlets—at least in 
the short-term—futile. 
 The first attempt at establishing a nationwide broadcasting net-
work in Bosnia, known as the Open Broadcast Network (OBN),85 
made the mistake of relying on the cooperation of pre-existing local 
television stations. Seen as more efficient than creating a new net-
work from the ground up, OBN planned to connect existing inde-
pendent local stations into a nationwide network and provide train-
ing and equipment to those local stations.86 The OHR spearheaded 
and administered the project, while financial support came directly 
from a broad array of enthusiastic donors such as the United States 
Information Agency, several European Union member states, and 
George Soros’ Open Society Institute.87 In the radio realm, a similar 
attempt to create a nationwide, pluralist broadcast entity was the 
Free Elections Radio Network (FERN), a joint project of OSCE and 
the Swiss government. Both networks were meant to provide objec-
tive and timely information on the initial post-war elections to all 
peoples in all areas of Bosnia88 and intended to use and develop lo-
cal journalists.89 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Price, supra note 35, at 8. 
 86. There were initially two different potential models for the network. The OHR 
wanted to “build a new network with journalists covering all sides of the ethnic conflict, as 
well as a large number of staff and officers brought from outside the country.” Id. All of the 
donors, however, wanted “to provide training to the existing independent stations, then 
build an affiliate network that would connect them.” Id. The donors feared that an entirely 
new entity created by the OHR would be seen as imposed on Bosnia by foreigners and 
therefore would lack credibility. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 7. 
 89. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 38. 
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 Entrenched political interests strongly opposed OBN and FERN’s 
development and actively worked to subvert their success by exerting 
their own influence in defiance of the international reformers’ 
agenda. As for OBN, not one station in the Serbian entity agreed to 
be part of the network, and only a few in the Bosniac-Croat federa-
tion were willing to do so.90 When OBN went on the air just a few 
days before the 1996 elections, only one-third of the Bosnian popula-
tion could see it, and there was no coverage in the Serbian Republic, 
the region most in need of a media outlet with a moderate, impartial 
point of view.91 As a result, OBN was spectacularly unsuccessful in 
transforming the Bosnian media into a forum for accurate, pluralist, 
nonpartisan debate. And after the 1996 elections, the Bosnian na-
tional government tried to undermine OBN’s future success by accus-
ing OHR of impermissibly granting OBN a broadcast license without 
coordinating with Bosnia’s authorities and thus interfering with ex-
isting frequencies.92 Unable to sustain itself financially, OBN de-
clared bankruptcy and shut down in 1999.93 
 Similarly, local authorities obstructed FERN’s ability to proceed. 
For example, Bosnian Serbs “claimed they could not install the 
transmitters FERN needed because the roads leading to the moun-
tains where they needed to be placed were mined.”94 Due to tactics 
such as this, FERN went on the air just two months before the 1996 
election and reached only forty percent of the territory of Bosnia, 
none of which was in the Serbian entity.95 Neither OBN nor FERN 
were able to threaten the dominance of the politically and ethnically 
aligned media whose influence over the elections they were meant 
to mitigate.96  
 In Kosovo, reformers only temporarily avoided the mistakes made 
in Bosnia. Again avoiding the creations of a province-wide, pluralist, 
impartial network from nothing, UNMIK and OSCE took over RTP 
from the Serbian regime and relaunched it as Radio Television Kos-
ovo (RTK).97 When RTK first was launched, UNMIK and OSCE put 
in place international managers who, in turn, hired journalists 
mostly from the Albanian émigré community, rather than rehire the 
Kosovar Albanians who had worked for RTP prior to the Serbian 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See Price, supra note 35, at 8. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 9. 
 93. L. Kendall Palmer, The Power-Sharing Process: Media Reforms in Bosnia-
Herzegovina 12 (Feb. 9, 2001) (unpublished paper, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
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 94. Price, supra note 35, at 7. 
 95. Id. at 7. 
 96. See THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 38. 
 97. Price, supra note 35, at 35. 
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takeover.98 Not surprisingly, this hiring decision created resentment 
among former employees,99 but it was not without purpose. According 
to some observers, the group of former employees that were excluded 
from becoming involved with RTK from the beginning were affiliated 
with the KLA and planned to use their positions at RTK to advance 
the KLA agenda.100 As a result of the international control over edito-
rial and content decisions, RTK provided relatively evenhanded and 
accurate reporting of events within and around Kosovo during its 
first two years of existence. 
 Vesting initial editorial control in non-Kosovars and excluding po-
litically motivated employees from taking part in RTK succeeded 
only briefly in preventing RTK from becoming politicized. Over the 
course of RTK’s first two years, responsibility for RTK management 
and editorial decisions gradually devolved from international admin-
istrators to local journalists.101 As this move progressed, the broad-
cast content became more one-sided, anti-Serb, anti-UN, and anti-
KFOR.102 The Serbian-language aspects of the network were elimi-
nated when a Kosovar Albanian journalist took over management.103 
And as RTK became more and more a wholly local entity, there were 
accusations that it favored one local politician over another.104 
Though such allegations could not be proved (the tapes of the broad-
casts in question mysteriously disappeared before they could be re-
viewed),105 there is evidence that local factions were jostling for con-
trol of the network and the power that its information-dissemination 
capability conferred. Thus OSCE’s aim of establishing a pluralist, 
multi-ethnic entity failed to outlast the international control over 
the network.106  
 UNMIK and OSCE’s belief that they could establish a pluralist, 
province-wide network and remove their heavy regulatory hand so 
quickly without allowing RTK to fall prey to the factional battles so 
evident in Kosovo’s print media,107 especially considering those or-
ganizations’ prior experience in Bosnia, appears naïve. Kosovo’s dif-
ferent ethnic groups and political factions had long seen their influ-
ence over information flow as a tool with which to further their po-
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litical agendas.108 The mere creation of a network that would reach 
all of Kosovo’s residents, without significant regulation, manage-
ment, or intervention by neutral actors, could not hope to remove this 
tactic from local politicians’ tool chests. 
 Recognizing the significant impediments to forging broad-based, 
national democratic consciousness in the immediate post-conflict 
phase of democratization in deeply divided societies leads to several 
suggestions for approaching the goals of pluralism—full and fair de-
bate and the development of a tolerant, productive civil society. Re-
call that democratization is a long-term, dynamic process, and that it 
may have several phases.109 Reform efforts or regulations that are 
appropriate at a given point in time may not be effective or desirable 
at another. Similarly, departure from democratic norms may be more 
easily justified when a transitional society has made relatively little 
progress toward the ultimate goal of a stable democratic state.  
 An initial lesson is that the preliminary success with RTK in Kos-
ovo indicates that an aggressive agenda of editorial control and in-
ternational oversight has the potential to establish the type of na-
tionwide network that the international community had in mind for 
Bosnia and Kosovo.110 It is also apparent that relinquishing this con-
trol too early risks sacrificing any progress that has been made. 
Thus, if an attempt at creating a pluralist network is undertaken in 
the initial phases of democratization in a deeply divided society, in-
ternational or neutral management of some form must stay in place 
until the divisions that render locally controlled pluralist networks 
unlikely have abated. This suggestion flies in the face of the liberal 
media independence principles that preclude government regulation 
or editorial management and that insist on media self-regulation. 
But in deeply divided societies, impediments to pluralism and na-
tionwide debates are deeply entrenched within the local political 
power struggles. When local political actors have nothing to gain and 
everything to lose from permitting the media sector to transition 
from one controlled by political agendas to one that operates accord-
ing to western standards of professionalism, they are unlikely to ac-
quiesce in or support reformers’ attempts to facilitate this transition 
by living up to the democratic expectations for government actors to 
respect media independence.  
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[T]heorists of power-sharing have recognized that in societies with 
severe ethnic divides, democratic institutions need to go far be-
yond standard democratic procedures to ensure adequate ethnic 
representation and minimize conflict between ethnic groups. If 
such steps are needed in governance in divided societies, they may 
also be necessary in other institutions.111  
In other words, if the various sectors of society are unwilling to form 
a wholly integrated political unit, it is unlikely that efforts to forge a 
wholly integrated media sector will succeed absent significant inter-
vention. While such ethnically focused arrangements may or may not 
be appropriate in the design of formal political institutions such as 
the presidency or the legislature, the argument for them is particu-
larly compelling in the context of institutions, such as the media, 
whose makeup, even in an established democracy, is not traditionally 
selected by the electorate. Until there is some sense among local ac-
tors that their own interests will be served by buying into a national 
identity that includes former enemies and rivals, any insistence on 
media self-regulation as a limiting principle will preclude the exis-
tence of nationwide, pluralist media sources.  
 So the first lesson is that, in the immediate post-conflict phase of 
transition where societal divisions still heavily influence political 
agendas, the creation of a nationwide, pluralist media can only be 
embarked upon through a rejection of the democratic nonregulation 
principle. If such an entity hopes to escape sectarian political influ-
ence, it must be aggressively managed by a neutral regulator or ad-
ministrator. This is, of course, only an option in situations where, 
like Bosnia and Kosovo, there is an international presence that can 
act independently of any local political agenda.  
 But the only options available to reformers who hope to facilitate 
the emergence of a pluralist media are not either to create an inter-
nationally controlled network or simply to stand by passively and 
wait for a unified national consciousness to emerge; instead, they 
might take a multi-phased approach. In the initial post-conflict pe-
riod, they can take steps to encourage the development of a national 
consciousness and the break down of the power structures that im-
pede its development. Once these obstacles to the creation of plural-
ist national media outlets have been reduced or eliminated, the sec-
ond phase of reform can focus on the media outlets themselves.  
 The first phase can be implemented in two ways. The first is 
through an alternative media reform focus. In situations such as 
Bosnia and Kosovo, rather than expecting any one information 
source to serve the entirety of the population—who live in different 
geographical areas and who speak different languages—initial re-
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form efforts should focus instead on ensuring that the information 
sources that the various populations do rely on are providing accu-
rate and unbiased information and that there are multiple media 
sources available within each community. In other words, focus on 
intra-ethnic or intra-factional pluralism so that within each segment 
of society there are a variety of voices and that those voices present a 
variety of perspectives. It is unlikely, for example, that all Bosnian 
Muslims hold the same views on every issue. So while it might be 
unrealistic to expect Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs to turn to 
the same media sources for information, different Bosnian Muslims 
could be presented with different types of information sources. 
Within this theoretical pluralistic Bosnian Muslim media sector, a 
variety of voices might emerge—some more moderate, some more na-
tionalistic. And this variety of voices might contribute to civic debate 
and ideological tolerance in the same way that the UN and OSCE 
hoped that a nationwide broadcaster would. Perhaps eventually this 
intra-ethnic or intra-factional pluralism might result in some voices 
in favor of the international community’s ultimate political goal of a 
unified society. And if that goal gains support among moderate forces 
within each ethnic community, over time unified media sources will 
emerge as a national consciousness emerges. At the proper time, if 
that time comes, the international community can then move to the 
next phase and attempt to facilitate the emergence of those sources. 
But to expect unified media to precede a sense of unified national 
identity is unrealistic. The international community cannot force a 
national identity on a group of people who do not already possess 
that identity or even aspire to develop it. 
 A parallel path to eventual pluralism focuses on the broader po-
litical context rather than focusing narrowly on the media sector. If 
the major impediments to pluralism come from those political enti-
ties who have the most to lose from minimizing existing societal divi-
sions, political defeat or marginalization of those entities will tend to 
reduce those impediments. As the old power structures and alliances 
break down over time—due to changed conditions on the ground, in-
ternational efforts on the political front, pressures from allies or in-
tergovernmental organizations, the natural aging of charismatic 
leaders, etc.—the old ways of thinking about the structure of society 
will evolve as well. And if the democratization process continues ef-
fectively, a single national consciousness eventually will come to be 
more powerful than the old, sectarian ones. At such a point pluralism 
in media, like pluralism in society more broadly, becomes possible. 
Recognizing their impact on media pluralism, media reformers 
should actively engage with the reform attempts going on in other 
societal institutions in an effort to coordinate the pursuit of plural-
ism within society at large.  
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2.   Imposing Regulatory Frameworks 
 The other major reform initiative undertaken in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo shows stark contrasts with the attempts to create nation-
wide or province-wide broadcast networks. This was the attempt to 
establish and enforce a comprehensive regulatory system for the me-
dia, which included both the development and enforcement of profes-
sional codes of conduct requiring accuracy and fairness in reporting 
and the prohibition of hate speech and incitement.112 Unlike the plu-
ralist network initiatives, these proposed regulatory schemes met 
significant opposition not only from local actors but also from inter-
national media organizations and powerful media entities. Also 
unlike the networks discussed above, media regulation plans would 
have significantly enhanced media reform efforts in the early stages 
of both Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s transition processes. But instead of ag-
gressively forging ahead with these plans in the early stages of re-
form, the international authorities repeatedly balked in the face of 
objections based on the norms developed for established democracies 
with entrenched respect for the rule of law and a sincere commit-
ment to a free press by all relevant actors and failed to recognize that 
the circumstance with which they were faced justified a departure 
from those norms. Ultimately, these regulatory schemes were im-
posed, but only after significant delays. As a result, reformers lost 
the valuable opportunity to affect significantly the role of the media 
sector in the immediate wake of the recently ended conflicts, espe-
cially with respect to the highly problematic use of hate speech.113 
Moreover, not only should the international regulators have insisted 
at the outset on carrying out their proposed regulatory schemes, they 
also should have acted much more aggressively to promulgate, en-
courage, or insist upon legal provisions that would have created an 
environment with the necessary preconditions for journalistic profes-
sionalism.  
 There were several factors at work in both Bosnia and Kosovo 
that should have alerted regulators that they would have to modify 
or disregard some of the standard norms applied to media sectors in 
established democracies when it came to general media regulation 
measures. As discussed above, the generally accepted norms of media 
governance dictate that the media must be both independent and 
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professional. The desire for independent media, which must resist al-
lowing improper influences to affect editorial decisions, leads to a 
strict presumption against regulation of the press by government ac-
tors who could use those regulations to censor or influence media 
content. Instead, the government’s role is often limited to technical 
areas such as management and assignment of broadcast frequencies, 
leaving the media to regulate its own members’ activities and the 
content of their reporting, with the expectation that this self-
regulation will include a mechanism that ensures professionalism 
among members of the media. For adherence to these norms to make 
sense, the media must be both able and willing to resist improper 
editorial influence and to self-regulate.  
 The very reason that media reform efforts were necessary in Bos-
nia and Kosovo was that these ideals—an independent media that 
resists improper influence and a culture of professionalism that en-
sures accurate, evenhanded reporting—had never taken hold there. 
In fact, contrary to what some detractors claimed,114 the media sec-
tors in Bosnia and Kosovo had never exhibited the characteristics of 
independence or professionalism and thus were in no position to po-
lice themselves. One need simply look at the type of reporting that 
dominated the airwaves and the newspaper stands to recognize that 
the limiting principles embodied in the press codes proposed by in-
ternational reformers had yet to find a home in the professional dic-
tates of the journalists to which they were meant to apply. For ex-
ample, in the summer of 2000, the Kosovo daily Dita accused a UN 
translator of taking part in war crimes as part of a Serb paramilitary 
group. The article, which published the employee’s name, address, 
and photograph, amounted to a call for revenge against this individ-
ual who was, in fact, abducted and found stabbed to death no more 
than two weeks after the publication of the article.115 In the after-
math of these events, Dita’s publisher was unapologetic as he ex-
plained that the UN’s failed criminal justice efforts in Kosovo forced 
his actions, and he pledged to continue to act in the same manner go-
ing forward.116 If the journalism community is not able to impose the 
necessary standards on itself, then perhaps as an initial step, those 
standards must be imposed on it by an outside entity. Through these 
externally imposed standards, international reformers can attempt 
to instill the sense of responsibility and loyalty to the public interest 
that seems to be lacking, in the hopes that the principles contained 
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therein will eventually be accepted, internalized, and then fol-
lowed voluntarily.  
 In addition to a dearth of media professionalism among Bosnia 
and Kosovo’s media, there was an alarming lack of independence. In 
Bosnia, the distribution of propaganda was a major contributor to the 
war and remained a source of post-war ethnic tension and divisive-
ness in Bosnian communities.117 And, as discussed above, Bosnian 
broadcast networks clung to their ethnocentric worldviews and 
tended to advance only ideas consistent with their nationalistic af-
filiations. In contrast to Bosnia, where the broadcast media reigned, 
Kosovo’s print media was the local source of most news and informa-
tion,118 but it was equally troubled. Most print periodicals were na-
tionalistic, tending to print incendiary and inaccurate reports, often 
of a nature that would put the subjects of those reports in danger. 
Echoing the pre-war era tendencies, many newspapers that emerged 
in post-conflict Kosovo were aligned with political parties.119 These 
publications used their pages to further a political agenda, often la-
beling the few independent editors and journalists that did exist as 
Serb collaborators.120 In short, the media in both places engaged in 
biased reporting, which often took the form of attacks on rival politi-
cal or ethnic groups. In the course of the conflicts that played out in 
these places, the media had played an active role in instigating vio-
lence, in enflaming ethnic tensions, in using stereotypes and un-
founded accusations to further a particular political agenda, and in 
drawing attention to and highlighting the ethnic divisions extant in 
the country or territory in question. This type of reporting resulted 
from local political leaders’ influence exerted in a variety of ways, 
leading to media content intended to advance specific agendas rather 
than to provide accurate information. This propagandization of the 
media sector meant that, rather than working as a force for recon-
ciliation, peace, and understanding—as it ideally does in established 
democracies by serving as a conduit of information between rival 
points of view—these media often served to undermine the interna-
tional community’s attempts to facilitate a transition to a stable, 
peaceful, democratic society.  
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 The principle of nonregulation is intended to prevent skewing me-
dia content through political control and to allow the media to con-
duct their own affairs according to the internal ethics of responsible 
journalism. Moreover, it is largely meant to curb attempts to censor 
criticism of the government or of public officials. But in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, nonregulation meant ensuring that existing political control 
of the media would continue, that local leaders could silence criticism 
at will, and that local journalists would not be held to the profes-
sional standards that govern journalists in stable democracies. Non-
regulation is intended to ensure that all points of view are able to be 
freely expressed and that expression of one point of view may be 
countered by those who disagree with it. When the airwaves and 
newspaper columns are full of only one point of view or of hate 
speech targeting a particular population unable to present its own 
perspective (because of its minority status or lack of political power 
or socioeconomic conditions or lack of sympathetic media outlet), 
some steps must be taken to ensure that the information that is dis-
seminated is accurate and that expression that is not aligned with 
the predominant power is permitted to be heard. 
 The international regulators in Bosnia and Kosovo recognized the 
need to put in place some limitations on and guidelines for the me-
dia, and in an effort to do so, they crafted comprehensive regulatory 
schemes. An examination of the implementation of these schemes, 
however, reveals an unfortunate pattern. The UN, OSCE, and 
UNMIK officials repeatedly determined that regulatory measures 
were necessary to overcome the destabilizing tendencies born of the 
local media’s partisan agendas and to promote an evolution toward a 
professional, independent media. And they repeatedly designed plans 
aimed at achieving those goals. But each attempt to implement such 
a plan fell victim to hesitancy on the part of the international re-
formers actually to intervene in the editorial decision of local media 
outlets. This hesitancy arose sometimes from the regulators’ own 
sensibilities regarding media freedom, but more often it was the re-
sult of pressure from international media organizations or powerful 
media entities, whose opposition was motivated not by the desire to 
serve the best interests of Bosnian or Kosovar media reform, but in-
stead by their commitment to the principle of nonregulation of the 
media in any form. 
 In Bosnia, the Dayton Accords’ implementers twice determined 
that comprehensive media regulation was essential for effective me-
dia reform. First, in an effort to ensure a fully informed electorate for 
the September 1996 elections, OSCE issued rules for the media to 
follow: All media were expected to provide true and accurate infor-
mation, to refrain from broadcasting incendiary programming, and to 
carry OSCE and international election-related statements and adver-
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tisements. The three party-controlled networks also were expected to 
allow equal advertising time to opposition parties.121 The OSCE 
failed to enforce these regulations systematically, however, thus ren-
dering them largely ineffective.122 The lack of progress prior to the 
1996 elections prompted the Steering Board of the Peace Implemen-
tation Council, the international body charged with implementing 
the Dayton Accords,123 to conclude that more aggressive efforts to en-
courage independent, professional, and pluralist media were 
needed.124 Recognizing that the local pro-status-quo media were a 
threat to the peace and democratization process in Bosnia and that 
initial efforts at reform had failed,125 the resulting so-called Sintra 
Declaration gave OHR significantly more power, including the right 
to “curtail or suspend any media network or programme whose out-
put is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or 
letter of [the Dayton Accords].”126 The OHR used its enhanced powers 
to create a comprehensive media law framework to address irrespon-
sible, unprofessional reporting.127 The Independent Media Commis-
sion (IMC), created in 1998,128 had the power to license broadcasters, 
to develop codes of practice for broadcast media, and to impose sanc-
tions for violations of those codes.129 It also was involved in drafting a 
press code for print media, but it was not empowered to impose sanc-
tions for violations of that code, instead relying on the print media 
for self-regulation.130 
 Despite the Steering Board and OHR’s conclusion that aggressive 
media regulation was the most promising means of increasing the 
professionalism and independence of Bosnia’s media sector, interna-
tional media organizations and other groups devoted to preserving 
the principles of free speech found the IMC, its codes of conduct, and 
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Steering Board (Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=38563. 
 124. Price, supra note 35, at 10. 
 125. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 38-39. 
 126. U.N. Sec. Council, Office of the High Representative, Peace Implementation Coun-
cil Sintra Declaration, ¶ 70, 52d Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1997/434 (May 30, 1997); see 
also Richard Caplan, International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 53, 56-57 (2004); Price, supra note 35, at 10. 
 127. Price, supra note 35, at 12. 
 128. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 40 Price, supra note 35, at 12. 
 129. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 40; Price, supra note 35, at 12. 
 130. Pech, supra note 81, at 15; see INT’L PRESS INST., WORLD PRESS FREEDOM REVIEW: 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2001), available at http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom_ 
detail.html?country=/KW0001/KW0003/KW0052/&year=2001. 
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other efforts by the international authorities in Bosnia to regulate 
media scandalous. While these international and western journalists’ 
organizations agreed that a free, independent, professional press is 
the ultimate goal,131 they do not accept that the means of achieving 
this goal sometimes might need to depart from established norms.132 
According to this view, it is the very regulation that the international 
community justifies as a means toward an independent media that 
prevents such a media from existing. Thus they saw the OSCE regu-
latory system as a threat to freedom of speech in Bosnia and feared 
that, in a place with no historical tradition of free media, it set a 
dangerous precedent for authoritarian control over media content.133 
Conceding the good intentions of the architects of the scheme, these 
groups nonetheless considered any legal body with jurisdiction over 
journalists to raise free speech concerns.134 In the words of the World 
Press Freedom Committee (WPFC), an organization committed to 
the promotion of the free press, “in countries lacking the foundations 
of democracy—including free and fair popular elections, a free and 
independent news media and independent courts—mechanisms such 
as press laws, media councils, and ethics codes have been used rou-
tinely as tools of restriction on the free flow of information 
and news.”135 
 Despite the lessons learned in Bosnia and the power of UNMIK, 
as territorial administrator in Kosovo, to impose necessary regula-
tions, regulatory efforts in Kosovo produced a similar pattern: a per-
ceived need for regulation, outspoken opposition to proposed regula-
tory plans, and subsequent retrenchment by international authori-
ties. The UN’s mission in Kosovo began around the same time that 
the OHR in Bosnia had abandoned case-by-case oversight over 
broadcasters in favor of the comprehensive regulatory scheme led by 
the IMC.136 UN officials felt that the failure to take an aggressive 
stance with the Bosnian media early in the post-conflict era had al-
lowed that media to undermine Dayton’s implementation. Deter-
mined to avoid such a mistake in Kosovo, UNMIK and OSCE in-
                                                                                                                     
 131. E.g., WPFC Charter, supra note 27, at pmbl., princ. 2 (“A free press means a free 
people. To this end . . . [i]ndependent news media, both print and broadcast, must be al-
lowed to emerge and operate freely in all countries.”). 
 132. Id. at princ. 1 (“[G]overnment authorities . . . must not interfere with the content 
of print or broadcast news . . . .”). 
 133. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 41. 
 134. See Stephen Schwartz, Europe Should Leave the Balkan Media Alone, WALL ST. J. 
EUROPE, Aug. 27, 1999, at 6; Philip Shenon, Allies Creating Press-Control Agency in Bos-
nia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1998, at A8. 
 135. Press Release, World Press Freedom Committee, World Press Freedom Commit-
tee Concerned About “Protection” Measures in BiH (Feb. 11, 2000), 
http://www.ifex.org/fr/content/view/full/9577/. 
 136. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. 
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tended to regulate the media there rigorously from the outset.137 This 
position was supported by members of the local media dedicated to 
successful reform, who recognized that “limited government regula-
tion of media content in Kosovo [was] justified in the immediate post-
conflict period, and while the region’s media [was] becoming re-
established”138 and was a necessary means of avoiding the potentially 
bloody consequences of hate speech.139 And because UNMIK was the 
government in Kosovo, it had much greater leeway to act than OHR 
ever did in Bosnia.  
 The initial instinct of the Kosovo reformers was a good one. At the 
outset of its involvement in Kosovo, OSCE announced a comprehen-
sive regulatory plan similar to the one established by the OHR in 
Bosnia and led by the IMC.140 The regulatory regime would have “the 
power to censor material judged dangerous or incendiary,”141 and to 
penalize, fine, or shut down media outlets that violated internation-
ally established reporting standards.142 It also would write and ad-
minister a Broadcasting Code of Practice and a Press Code for print 
journalists.143 These measures, like those in Bosnia, were modeled on 
Western European and North American ideals of media conduct and 
were described as means to “bring people up to Western standards” 
so “they can operate on their own” while “preventing the abuse of the 
media . . . so it can’t be used to urge people to go out in the streets 
and create riots.”144  
 The international media community’s response, based on the 
highly contested and largely inaccurate premise that pre-war media 
in Kosovo had been professional and independent,145 was swift and 
almost universally opposed OSCE’s proposed plan. The WPFC, the 
New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the International Fed-
eration of Journalists all denounced OSCE’s plan as infringing on 
press freedom and setting a dangerous precedent for long-term cen-
sorship.146 In response to the strident and well-publicized opposition 
to OSCE’s initial proposed regulatory scheme, UNMIK limited 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Price, supra note 35, at 27; see THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 63-64. 
 138. DEMPSEY & FONTAINE, supra note 49, at 127 (quoting INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra 
note 118, at 17). 
 139. Press Release, Committee to Protect Journalists, Civility by Decree: Why Many 
Kosovo Journalists Want Censorship (Sept. 23, 1999), 
http://www.ifex.org/index.php/en/content/view/full/8625.  
 140. Price, supra note 35, at 31. 
 141. Id. at 31-32. 
 142. Id. at 31.  
 143. Id. at 31. 
 144. Erlanger, supra note 114. 
 145. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 64; Erlanger, supra note 114. 
 146. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 64; Price, supra note 35, at 32; Erlanger, supra note 
114; Schwartz, supra note 134; Editorial, Kosovo’s Incipient Media Ministry, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 1999, at A18. 
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OSCE’s mandate, removing its ability to impose binding sanctions on 
media outlets that violated the established codes of practice.147 In-
stead, OSCE had the power only to “encourage journalists to volun-
tarily establish an ethical code.”148 In the face of these toothless 
measures, the Kosovar Albanian media continued its business as 
usual, becoming more and more incendiary as time went on.149  
 This now-familiar dance repeated itself time and time again in 
Kosovo. Continued biased and inaccurate reporting—sometimes even 
leading to violence—would prompt OSCE or the SRSG to consider 
imposing a press code,150 to promulgate anti-hate speech regula-
tions,151 to temporarily shut down an offending publication,152 and fi-
nally to impose a comprehensive regulatory scheme remarkably simi-
lar to the one contemplated at the outset of OSCE’s mission in Kos-
ovo.153 And in response to each proposal or regulatory action, a hue 
and cry was raised that UNMIK and OSCE were imposing a censor-
ship regime in Kosovo, that they were interfering with the free press 
and free speech, and that the only acceptable means of press regula-
tion was self-regulation by the industry itself.154 Often these objec-
tions came from international free press organizations like the 
WPFC or from powerful media entities such as the New York Times 
or the Wall Street Journal.155 Sometimes they came from within the 
local Kosovar journalism community.156 But sometimes they also 
came, albeit more quietly, from officials within OSCE itself who had 
qualms about imposing a heavy regulatory hand on media content.157  
                                                                                                                     
 147. Price, supra note 35, at 32; see THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 64. 
 148. Price, supra note 35, at 33. 
 149. Id. at 32-35. An example is an article published in the daily Bota Sot, which 
stated that a Human Rights Watch official who issued a report condemning Albanian re-
venge attacks against Kosovo’s Serbs was a homosexual. In Kosovo’s homophobic culture, 
such an allegation can render an individual vulnerable to harassment or attacks. Id. at 34.  
 150. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 65. 
 151. LOEWENBERG, supra note 102, at 18. In response to increased use of hate speech, 
in early 2000, the SRSG promulgated a regulation prohibiting incitement to national, ra-
cial, religious, or ethnic hatred, discord, or intolerance. Price, supra note 35, at 34. 
 152.  See, e.g., DEMPSEY & FONTAINE, supra note 49, at 127-28; Semini, supra note 115. 
 153. The plan included binding codes of conduct and the possibility of robust sanctions. 
The conduct codes prohibited unnecessarily inflaming public opinion or inciting ethnic or 
religious hatred, crime or death, injury, damage to property, or other violence, as well as 
primarily or exclusively promoting the interests of one political party. It also included pro-
visions calling for accuracy, fairness, impartiality, and civility. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra 
note 118, at 16. 
 154. See id. at 16-17. 
 155. Peter van Agtmael, Dita in the Dock Again, in IWPR’s BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, 
NO. 154 (July 10, 2000) (describing ARTICLE 19’s objection to the regulations based on 
fear that other governments will follow the UN’s example); Schwartz, supra note 134. 
 156. Semini, supra note 115. 
 157. In response to the SRSG’s 1999 proposal to impose a press code on the print me-
dia, officials within OSCE insisted on adherence to the principle that, when it comes to the 
press, only self-regulation is permissible. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 65. Similarly, when 
SRSG temporarily shut down the daily paper Dita for a report in which it published the 
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 The vocal opposition to government or international regulation of 
the media was not unprincipled or insincere; it simply failed to see 
the entire picture. The objecting organizations and entities were in-
voking accepted norms of the free press: the prohibition on govern-
ment interference with media content and the insistence that the 
press itself should be the entity to regulate its members. What this 
Article fundamentally argues, however, is that accepted norms—
which are highly valuable or even necessary in established democra-
cies—do not necessary supply the best guidance for crafting democra-
tization or transitional regimes. The international media organiza-
tions that resisted the UN, SRSG, OHR, and OSCE’s attempts to 
regulate the media in Bosnia and Kosovo failed to consider whether 
the circumstances in those places raised a different set of considera-
tions, one that might justify broadening the scope of permissible 
regulation beyond what might be acceptable in America, Britain, 
or France.  
 The opposition of organizations such as the WPFC and the New 
York Times was based on two premises, both stemming from the dic-
tates of the liberal democratic media principles outlined above. The 
first was a knee-jerk reaction to any form of government regulation 
of the media regardless of the context in which it occurred or the 
evils it was designed to remedy. This reaction was justified by the 
fear that regulations in the Balkans would set dangerous precedent 
for government regulation of the media elsewhere, where it might be 
applied abusively, and that the regulatory measures would embolden 
repressive governments elsewhere to censor the media in their coun-
tries and point to the international community’s actions in the Bal-
kans as justification for those repressive measures.158 In other words, 
the historical proposition that “in countries lacking the foundations 
of democracy—including free and fair popular elections, a free and 
independent news media and independent courts—mechanisms such 
as press laws, media councils and ethics codes have been used rou-
tinely as tools of restriction on the free flow of information and 
news”159 is what drove these organizations. Their opposition was not 
based on specific objections to the way that the regulations would af-
fect Bosnia and Kosovo and did not propose alternative means of ef-
fecting change in those locales. Nor did the objectors take into ac-
count the specific conditions that prevailed in Bosnia and Kosovo 
                                                                                                                     
name, address, work schedule, and photograph of a UN translator, along with accusations 
that he had taken part in war crimes as a member of a Serb paramilitary group, OSCE 
privately argued that a more hands-off approach, such as calling for a retraction or apol-
ogy, would have been appropriate. The translator was abducted and stabbed to death two 
weeks after this publication. Semini, supra note 115. 
 158. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 118, at 16-17; van Agtmael, supra note 155. 
 159. World Press Freedom Committee, supra note 135. 
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when opposing regulatory plans.160 And they never directly addressed 
the possibility that the proposed measures were not necessary to 
remedy the media situation in those places or that they would not 
have salutary effects there.  
 In a place where, as the WPFC itself pointed out,161 there is no 
history, tradition, or culture of independent, professional media, it is 
not realistic to expect the profession to self-regulate according to 
those standards. In order to change media behavior, there must 
therefore be some form of intervention from outside the media indus-
try.162 And because the media’s behavior created a destabilizing force 
in the democratization process, that behavior had to be changed. The 
insistence by the WPFC, the New York Times, the Wall Street Jour-
nal, and some local media entities that any press codes or broadcast 
codes should not be enforced by any authority outside the media ig-
nored the ways in which the lack of a culture of media professional-
ism rendered the norm of self-regulation ineffectual. After all, it was 
not the existence of the codes themselves that was deemed problem-
atic.163 Instead, based on the principle that the media must be relied 
upon to self-regulate according to codes of conduct to preserve its in-
dependence, it was the effort of OSCE and the UN to take control 
over the monitoring and enforcement of the codes to which many 
members of the media community objected. This usual objection that 
only the media should be allowed to impose such regulations on 
themselves was asserted, along with the claim that robust profes-
sional organizations of journalists would be able to achieve the same 
goals as the regulatory scheme.164 Again, these principles, which are 
                                                                                                                     
 160. See PUTZEL & VAN DER ZWAN, supra note 6, at 6 (noting that “[a]t times, political 
concerns and beliefs of external (Western) actors take priority over the realities that are 
present on the ground [in transitional societies]”); Allen & Stremlau, supra note 36, at 10 
(recognizing an “ ‘international legal absolutism’ ” adopted by many Western NGOs, such 
that “[s]pecific historic or political considerations, that might be required to address the 
particular local realities of countries in complex transitions, are subordinated to the ‘global 
justice agenda’ ”). 
 161. World Press Freedom Committee, supra note 135.  
 162. See Allen & Stremlau, supra note 36, at 2 (“In the aftermath of social upheaval, 
the crucial short-term issue is not how to promote freedom of speech but rather how con-
trols on expressing dissent should be exercised.”). 
 163. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 118, at 16; Schwartz, supra note 134. The con-
tents of the proposed codes, with the one exception already noted, were unobjectionable. 
After all, they were modeled on established practices in Western European and North 
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sions included guidelines on accuracy and balance and on reporting provocative state-
ments. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 40. Provisions also included rules and standards re-
quiring that the media shall not broadcast any material which incites ethnic or religious 
hatred, and a requirement to observe general community standards of decency and civility. 
Pech, supra note 81, at 14. They also promoted respect for the principles of freedom of in-
formation and an obligation to protect confidential sources. Id. at 15.  
 164. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 118, at 16-17; Schwartz, supra note 134. 
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powerful weapons against improper external influence of the press in 
places where the principles of media professionalism are firmly en-
trenched, are simply inapplicable in contexts where fundamental 
elements of a free press—the idea that the media operate in the pub-
lic interest and that they are bound to produce fair, accurate, bal-
anced, agenda-free reporting for the purposes of informing the popu-
lace regarding issues that are relevant to them—have never 
taken hold.  
 The other basis for objecting to proposed regulation of the media 
in Bosnia and Kosovo stemmed from a commitment to the pluralist 
public debate function of the media. Accepting this function of the 
press leads to the argument that, even in the cases of the most offen-
sive or potentially harmful expression, the remedy is not regulation 
prohibiting that expression; rather, it is more expression,165 thus al-
lowing counterarguments to win the day. Consequently, all govern-
ment action to limit speech through media regulation would seem to 
contradict this principle. But like the principle of nonregulation, this 
concept is inapplicable in some transitional situations. It relies on 
the premise that any ideas that are expressed can be countered by 
contrary ideas, and that through this process of debate the best, most 
convincing ideas will win out. But in a situation where there is one or 
few dominant voices, and where contrary viewpoints have no outlet 
for expression, it is hard to support this perspective. Here too, the 
particular circumstances in Bosnia—where each ethnic group had 
access to just one media outlet that espoused only one point of view—
and in Kosovo—where independent or contrary voices were rare and 
often subjected to intimidation or harassment—do not seem to sup-
port the usual justification for avoiding any content regulation.  
 That the strident objections to the imposition of what appeared to 
be an authoritarian regulatory scheme resonated not only with west-
ern media organizations but also with the regulators themselves 
shows the force that accepted media norms can exert. This is also 
what makes it all the more important that, in crafting reform plans, 
reformers consider the purpose of those norms and the assumptions 
on which they rest. When these assumptions, such as the idea that 
the media is able to self-regulate, do not hold true, any reform efforts 
must adjust their baseline principles accordingly. In both Bosnia and 
Kosovo, reformers allowed their inherent aversion to forceful regula-
tion of media practices and content to prevent them from aggres-
sively curtailing the detrimental effects of a partisan, unprofessional 
media sector until years into the reform process. Not only did this 
                                                                                                                     
 165. C. Edwin Baker, Genocide, Press Freedom, and the Case of Hassan Ngeze, 9 (Univ. 
of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 46, 
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hesitation allow harm to come to specific individuals, such as the 
Serbian translator killed as a result of Dita’s content, but it also sig-
nificantly delayed meaningful media reform. 
 The imposition of general regulation and professional codes was 
an important part of media democratization not just because Bosnia 
and Kosovo lacked a tradition of an independent and professional 
press, but also because of the particular threat posed by hate speech. 
As discussed above,166 democratization tactics must be tailored to the 
specific context of the place in which they are implemented. Context 
is important, and there is no “one size fits all” means of effecting a 
successful democratic transition. There is perhaps no other area 
where the differences between life in Sarajevo or Pristina and life in 
New York or London are more relevant than in the discussion of 
regulating hate speech and incitement. The situations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo—involving deeply divided societies, recent violent conflict, lo-
cal political actors’ tendency to control media outlets as tools to ad-
vance a particular political agenda, and (especially in Kosovo) the 
very real threat that incendiary reporting could lead to renewed vio-
lence—differ from those extant in stable, established democracies in 
ways that render blind adherence to the norms developed in that 
context inappropriate. Many of the regulations and press code provi-
sions proposed or implemented by the UN, OSCE, OHR, and SRSG 
were aimed at stamping out the phenomenon of accusatory, biased, 
stereotype-based reporting167 that posed a real threat to long term 
peace and stability. The blanket assertions by the WPFC and the 
New York Times that any media regulation scheme was a precursor 
to censorship and authoritarian abuse ignored several facts regard-
ing hate speech and its consequences in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the 
first place, regulating expressive content that constitutes hate speech 
is an accepted media regulation in most established liberal democra-
cies. Moreover, characteristics of transitional societies often will jus-
tify even those regulatory measures that would not be accepted in 
stable democracies.  
 Even among western liberal democracies, there is no consensus 
that hate speech regulations constitute a violation of free expression 
or media norms. Indeed, hate speech is regulated in many places that 
are considered to have a vibrant, fully functional free press,168 and 
                                                                                                                     
 166. See supra Part II.B. 
 167. All of the proposed press codes for both Bosnia and Kosovo included provisions 
prohibiting the incitement of ethnic or religious hatred and calling for civility. Pech, supra 
note 81, at 14. In Kosovo, the tenor of reporting in early 2000 prompted the SRSG to 
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ethnic hatred, discord, or intolerance. Price, supra note 35, at 34. 
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tion of Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 789, 803 (Austria, Belgium, France, 
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such regulations are considered fully compatible with international 
human rights requirements.169 Many of the provisions of the press 
codes to which the WPFC and the New York Times were so opposed 
were aimed at eliminating the stereotype-based, accusatory reporting 
that is often described as hate speech. Given the widespread accep-
tance of hate speech regulation, this opposition rests on one of two 
bases. First, the true objection may not have been to the hate speech 
provisions themselves, but rather to the broader regulatory scheme 
of which they were a part. Alternatively, it is possible that these or-
ganizations’ views simply reflect an American, First Amendment-
based theory of expression, where the restriction of hate speech is not 
permitted unless it is either intended as a threat170 or rises to the 
level of incitement,171 as opposed to what is often considered the 
European model, which accepts wider regulation of expression that 
constitutes hate speech. 
 Neither explanation justifies these organizations’ position. Before 
objecting to the overall regulatory scheme as a whole, they should 
have examined it to see whether it was, in fact, objectionable in all 
respects. Given the nature of reporting that the anti-hate speech 
provisions were meant to prevent, the specific conditions on the 
ground in Bosnia and Kosovo cried out for such provisions. Even a 
cursory investigation into the context in which the regulations were 
being implemented would have made that clear. Instead of simply 
reacting to the words “media regulation” without inquiring into what 
that truly meant and what it hoped to accomplish, the international 
free press advocates could have developed more nuanced arguments 
against those portions of the proposed regulatory scheme that actu-
ally violated accepted norms. Similarly, blind adherence to the ex-
tremely speech-protective American model, which has been rejected 
in all other jurisdictions, ignores the seriousness of the harm that 
hate speech can cause in post-conflict societies generally and in Bos-
nia and Kosovo in particular. 
                                                                                                                     
Germany, Israel, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland); Gregory S. Gordon, “A War of Media, 
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 169. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination both prohibit hate 
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 170. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003). 
 171. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
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 Even if prevailing norms in established democracies precluded 
hate speech regulation (or if all speech targeted by the regulations in 
Bosnia and Kosovo did not qualify as hate speech according to the 
definition used in established, stable democracies), the situations ad-
dressed in Bosnia and Kosovo would call for a departure from the 
nonintervention norm during the immediate post-conflict, transi-
tional phase. Even in the European and Inter-American context it is 
acknowledged that, in situations of conflict or tension, the actions of 
members of the media are especially important. Because the media 
risks contributing to tensions if it violates professional standards and 
engages in the dissemination of propaganda, racial or ethnic stereo-
types, or otherwise spreads messages of intolerance, authorities 
managing post-conflict situations must be particularly cognizant of 
these risks and act accordingly.172 Moreover, it is uncontested that in 
the specific contexts of Bosnia and Kosovo, the unprofessional nature 
of the media had contributed to tensions leading up to and during 
wartime and continued to contribute to such tensions in the post-
conflict stage. The destabilizing nature of hate speech in a transi-
tional phase generally, and in Bosnia and Kosovo in particular, 
means that reducing or eliminating such reporting is an essential 
step toward long-term reconciliation and peace.  
 Because the societies in question are post-conflict, deeply divided, 
and in transition—meaning they are susceptible to the tensions me-
dia hate speech could inflame, and that such inflammation risks de-
railing the transitional process that has only just begun—regulatory 
authorities should be permitted to subject an even broader swath of 
expression to regulatory measures than might be allowed in an es-
tablished democracy. In the U.S., where the rule of law is well-
established and where citizens largely trust the government and the 
judicial system to protect and vindicate their rights, only speech that 
is likely to cause imminent lawless action (thereby constituting in-
citement under U.S. law)173 is considered a threat justifying the limi-
tation of free speech rights. But in a place like Bosnia or Kosovo, 
where the ethnic tensions that recently led to war continue to bubble 
just beneath the surface, and where the institutions of government 
are either nascent or unreliable, a threat might be posed by words 
                                                                                                                     
 172. See Sener v. Turkey, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 377, ¶ 42 (“Particular caution is called for 
when consideration is being given to the publication of views which contain incitement to 
violence against the State lest the media become a vehicle for the dissemination of hate 
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 173. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
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that, in the U.S., might appear innocuous.174 So, a broadcast or an ar-
ticle whose contents perhaps should not be prohibited or punished 
somewhere in Western Europe actually might need to be regulated or 
restricted in a post-conflict or transitional society. The entire point of 
a transitional regime is to begin a long-term process that ultimately 
will lead to democracy. Thus, not only should incitement and hate 
speech be regulated, but so should any expression that serves to un-
dermine or promises to derail the democratization process. In other 
words, the goal should be to prevent reporting that creates the real 
threat of violence—whether imminent or otherwise—or that destabi-
lizes the transition process. For example, several of Kosovo’s news-
papers consistently inveighed against all Serbs as criminals and 
“routinely portray[ed] UMNIK and KFOR as being in league with the 
Serbs against the Albanians.”175 While these types of reports may not 
have invited imminent lawless action and may not even have quali-
fied as hate speech, depending on their particular content, they were 
certainly likely to undermine progress toward reconciliation, per-
petuate existing tensions and prejudices, and serve as obstacles to a 
successful transition.  
 This is not to say that the means of regulation and enforcement of 
hate speech provisions of any regulatory scheme need not be care-
fully crafted and thoughtfully designed. After all, the possibility of 
chilling legitimate reporting and the risk of abuse that motivate the 
WPFC and the New York Times’ response to such regulations are not 
inconsequential concerns. Any regulatory scheme that purports to af-
fect content and editorial decision must be as minimal as possible 
while still preventing the type of reporting that is likely to result in 
violence or destabilization. At the same time, it must be highly sensi-
tive to the context in which it is implemented, recognizing that a 
statement that would be highly unlikely to provoke a violent re-
sponse in America may nonetheless pose a real threat to the peace in 
Kosovo or any other location where the enmities that once led to vio-
lent conflict remain alive.  
                                                                                                                     
 174. For an example of this principle, consider that many observers now argue that, in 
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Allen & Stremlau, supra note 36, at 6-7. 
 175. THOMPSON, supra note 54, at 66. 
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 Starting at the most extreme end of the spectrum, some forms of 
expression call for criminal prosecution. Even in the jurisdictions 
that are most protective of free expression rights and that interpret 
such rights broadly, a government authority may regulate, and even 
criminally punish, expression that constitutes incitement to lawless-
ness or violence.176 And the international community also has the au-
thority to criminally prosecute incitement to genocide. In fact, in The 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, a case known as “The Media Trial,” mem-
bers of the Rwandan media were convicted in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for incitement to genocide and 
crimes against humanity in the form of persecution “on political 
grounds of an ethnic character” for their use of radio stations and 
newspapers in the furtherance of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.177 
 Similar criminal sanctions would have been appropriate for some 
media actions in Kosovo. In tactics reminiscent of the Rwandan me-
dia during the 1994 genocide, some Kosovar media outlets published 
names of Serbs believed to have committed war crimes, along with 
their addresses and places of employment.178 An incident already re-
ferred to above is illustrative of the problem. Recall the publication 
by Dita of the name, address, and photograph of the alleged Serb col-
laborator that resulted in his death.179 The SRSG’s response was to 
shut down Dita for eight days and to draft an emergency law prohib-
iting the print media from engaging in acts that would endanger life, 
safety, or security through vigilante violence.180 Dita’s publisher was 
unapologetic, blaming the UN’s failed criminal justice efforts in Kos-
ovo and pledging to continue to publish the names of Serbs believed 
to be involved in anti-Albanian activities.181 The Kosovo Journalists’ 
Association182 also denounced the closure of Dita as endangering 
press freedom.183 These objections illustrate the self-serving fashion 
in which some local journalists invoked international norms in an at-
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 177. The trial court convicted three members of the Rwandan media of these crimes 
based on media broadcasts and publications. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & 
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 181. Semini, supra note 115. 
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tempt to continue their irresponsible and destructive tactics. How-
ever, despite their claims that preventing such reporting is an im-
pingement on their free speech rights, Dita’s actions clearly fall 
within the scope of what is recognized as illegal incitement, punish-
able by criminal sanctions. Much of the media content that the UN 
and OSCE sought to prohibit in Bosnia and Kosovo could have been 
proscribed through criminalization of incitement.  
 In the United States, this is where we draw the line. Either a par-
ticular statement qualifies for criminal prosecution because it is in-
citement, or it may not be censored at all. But there is room, as Pro-
fessor Samuel Issacharoff points out, for some middle ground when 
the circumstances call for it.184 As noted above, hate speech is freely 
regulated in many western democratic societies and there is no con-
sensus that such regulation constitutes a violation of free expression 
or media norms.185 Making available measures such as required re-
tractions or corrections, public apologies, civil fines, or publicly ad-
ministered reprimands to offending journalists and editors would 
give administrators a means to regulate harmful reporting yet still 
have a more limited impact on expression.  
 Clearly and narrowly defining exactly what would constitute a 
violation of any particular hate speech regulation would also be an 
important way of limiting the detrimental or chilling effects on ex-
pression that the imposition of hate speech regulations might have. 
The Media Trial in the ICTR again illustrates the point. While those 
convictions were hailed almost universally as just,186 several concerns 
about the tribunal’s reasoning have been raised by journalists, inter-
national lawyers, and international media organizations with respect 
both to the arguably expansive definition of incitement to genocide187 
and the tribunal’s conclusion that the use of hate speech could consti-
tute the crime against humanity of persecution.188 These commenta-
tors point out that by expanding the definition of incitement to geno-
                                                                                                                     
 184. See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1417-18, 
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cide and by allowing the use of hate speech to qualify as persecution 
rising to the level of a crime against humanity, the ICTR made the 
category of what action constituted criminal behavior significantly 
more malleable. As a result, they argue, the ICTR decision can be 
(and has been) used as an excuse by repressive governments to im-
pose restrictions on the press in their countries.189 In order to avoid 
setting a precedent for authoritarian abuse and chilling legitimate 
journalistic speech, any regulation—criminal or civil—must make 
plain what it permits, what it restricts, and what penalties may be 
incurred. Regulators should ensure that only incitement may be 
criminally punished and that other restrictions or punishments are 
imposed only as needed to keep the democratization process alive.  
 Determining exactly which media reports should be subjected to 
such civil penalties or enforcement measures is a difficult task. In 
the end, it must be a process that places great weight on the context 
in which the media is reporting. As the trial chamber of the ICTR as-
tutely noted in The Media Trial, determining what qualifies as in-
citement requires a highly contextual inquiry.190 Nuances of lan-
guage, ethnic stereotypes, sources of historical tensions, and many 
other considerations go into determining what effect the presentation 
of a particular idea or set of facts will have. The same holds true for 
determining what speech will result in violence or destabilization of 
the democratization process. Because of the centrality of understand-
ing the context in which a particular regulation is administered, the 
administrator or administrative body in charge of implementing such 
regulation must combine expertise in media regulation with exper-
tise in local affairs. A regulatory scheme that is sensitive both to 
these contextual nuances and to the threats to free expression that 
excessive regulation poses will be able to strike the right balance for 
the specific circumstances in which they are working. 
3.   Missed Opportunities 
 International media reformers in Bosnia and Kosovo lost valuable 
opportunities when they allowed objections to media regulation to in-
terfere with their efforts. They also ceded significant reform opportu-
nities by failing to address more comprehensively the conditions that 
affected the media environment as a whole. Any comprehensive me-
dia scheme, along with the imposition of press codes and guidelines 
regarding content, must include a component aimed at this broader 
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media environment. As discussed above, stability is one of the ele-
ments most taken for granted in established democracies. This in-
cludes respect for the rule of law and broad acceptance—among po-
litical actors both within and without the government, the citizenry, 
civil society at large, and the media specifically—of all of the ac-
cepted liberal democratic norms, including the norms surrounding 
the role of the free press. But in transitional societies where the cul-
ture of democracy has not yet developed or is under attack from cer-
tain sectors, some effort must be made to protect the preconditions 
that are necessary for the press to act independently and responsibly. 
Media and free press watchdogs of all stripes acknowledge that the 
legal, political, and economic environment must permit journalists’ 
access to relevant information and refrain from exerting or 
permitting others to exert pressure—such as overt censorship, 
intimidation, excessive defamation punishments, or physical 
threats—that might chill journalists’ speech and effect their editorial 
decisions.191 Without the guarantee of things such as limitations on 
defamation penalties, robust physical protection of journalists, lib-
eral access to information laws, and protection of source confidential-
ity, even the most well-meaning journalist will struggle to satisfy the 
requirements of professionalism. 
 In crafting their media regulatory priorities, officials in Bosnia 
and Kosovo seem to have overlooked the fact that the media’s ability 
to conform to accepted international standards of independence and 
professionalism is highly contingent on the actions of other powerful 
actors, especially governmental or political powers. When those ac-
tors do not honor the norms surrounding media independence, it is 
impossible for the media to function according to accepted profes-
sional standards. A reporter committed to producing fair, accurate, 
evenhanded stories about government activity cannot hope to do so if 
the government that is the subject of her reporting refuses to respect 
the accepted norms of liberal access to information. Similarly, gov-
ernments that do not enshrine reporter confidentiality in their laws 
reduce the likelihood that sources will be willing to share relevant in-
formation with reporters. And, perhaps most importantly, journalists 
whose physical safety is threatened when their reporting does not 
conform to the desires of local power brokers are highly unlikely to be 
able to act according to accepted standards of professionalism and 
independence.  
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 Despite the fact that forces against media independence and pro-
fessionalism were at work from outside the media, the international 
community’s media reform plans for Bosnia and Kosovo imposed ex-
pectations on actors within the media that seemed to presume that 
the environment in which they were working conformed to accepted 
norms. One area where non-media actors’ failure to respect princi-
ples required for true media independence rendered professional re-
porting quite difficult was the media influence exerted by local politi-
cians. Their insistence on either exercising outright control of media 
outlets, as was largely the case with the three major television net-
works in post-conflict Bosnia,192 or exerting pressure through intimi-
dation or harassment means that even reporters committed to pro-
ducing unbiased content will be unable to do so. When local political 
actors have nothing to gain and everything to lose from permitting 
the media sector to transition from one controlled by political agen-
das to one that operates according to western standards of profes-
sionalism, they are unlikely to acquiesce in or support reformers’ at-
tempts to facilitate this transition by living up to the expectations for 
government actors to respect media independence. And when these 
forces use the tools at their disposal to prevent the development of 
independent journalism, a journalist can do very little to stop them.  
 The local journalists themselves often contributed to the problem. 
Local journalists’ enthusiasm for international reform efforts de-
pended on their status in the existing system. Politically affiliated or 
controlled media entities both supported the opposition to interna-
tional regulation and worked to undermine the independence of spe-
cific media outlets. Perhaps most illustrative is the experience at 
RTK in Kosovo. After successfully resisting initial efforts by KLA 
supporters to take over control of the network, the international 
community succeeded in starting up and running this province-wide, 
independent public broadcasting network for close to two years. De-
spite this initial and relatively sustained success, when Kosovars 
took control of RTK, it reverted to the same type of media outlet as 
the others that dominated Kosovo’s Albanian-language landscape.193 
In contrast, media entities in both Bosnia and Kosovo committed to 
independence welcomed proposed regulatory oversight as the only 
means of guaranteeing their freedom to engage in independent re-
porting.194 For example, while most local media condemned the 2000 
hate speech regulation as an infringement on their free speech 
rights, two independent dailies in Kosovo that often found their re-
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porting targeted by the types of speech that the regulation was 
meant to curb supported the measure.195 It is therefore clear that the 
extent to which any particular actor honored the right of journalists 
to engage in independent, professional reporting was dependent upon 
whether that actor had anything to gain from such reporting. In 
other words, independence itself became a tool of the political 
agenda. 
 The obvious effect of external influences on the media and the dif-
ficulties faced by media entities attempting to remain independent of 
the political fray illustrate the need for aggressive measures aimed 
at creating a media environment that exhibits the necessary precon-
ditions for independent, professional journalism. It is true that re-
formers made some efforts in this direction. In Bosnia, OHR and the 
rest of the international community implemented some measures in-
tended to combat concerns about threats and other pressures being 
brought to bear on journalists, thus helping to preserve the media’s 
independence and cut down on the ability of powerful actors to influ-
ence its content.196 For example, politically motivated defamation 
suits had become an effective tactic of preventing journalists from 
pursuing unfavorable reports about local government leaders.197 In 
response, OHR, in conjunction with OSCE and the IMC, launched a 
program to protect journalistic inquiry and free speech. Measures in-
cluded a “ ‘[d]ecision on freedom of information and decriminalisation 
of libel and defamation’ which called on the ‘entities’ to adopt legisla-
tion ‘to create civil remedies for defamation, libel and slander in ac-
cordance with the European Convention’ ” standards and to enact 
freedom of information laws, as well as the formation of a Press 
Council designed to implement the code of conduct adopted in 1999 
and the development of a set of guidelines for the police on the 
treatment of journalists.198 As mentioned above, the call to enact 
these legislative provisions was ignored by both entities.  
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 Ultimately, a reform policy that focuses on requiring media con-
tent simply to meet professional standards when the problem is not 
only the media’s lack of professionalism but also the pressure 
brought to bear on the media by other actors seems guaranteed to be 
futile. No code of conduct or regulation is going to eliminate the in-
fluences that originate outside the media itself. This is not to say 
that professionalization of the media is not both worthwhile and nec-
essary. But complementary efforts must also be undertaken to en-
sure that those professionalization efforts can be successful. When 
journalists are in danger simply for doing their jobs, media reform 
must include ensuring that a process is in place for investigating and 
punishing instances of threats, assaults, or intimidation of journal-
ists. Rules providing liberal access to government information must 
be promulgated and enforced. Measures ensuring source confidential-
ity must be implemented. Ties between local political leaders and the 
media outlets that they control must be severed. And, if possible, the 
threat that an independent media poses to these local political lead-
ers must be minimized so that their resistance to its development is 
also minimized. Until the trappings of independence—physical 
safety, source confidentiality, respect for liberal access rules, etc.—
exist, truly professional reporting is unlikely to be possible on an in-
dustry-wide basis. 
 In the end, it is important to note that all of the reforms discussed 
in this Part are intimately intertwined with one another. The expec-
tations set forth in the conduct codes—accuracy, lack of bias or politi-
cal agenda, etc.—will overlap significantly with the regulations re-
garding incitement or hate speech, and the measures taken to ensure 
media independence discussed will aid in allowing journalists to 
meet those expectations. Reporting that relies on ethnic stereotypes 
or characterizes one ethnic group as criminals199 will be both contrary 
to codes of ethical conduct and potentially incitement or hate speech. 
And reporting that is influenced by harassment or intimidation will 
continue to advance political agendas. Thus, each of these elements 
must be seen simply as one part of a wider regulatory effort, which 
ideally addresses each of these concerns simultaneously and which 
may be discontinued in later phases of the democratization process 
as progress is made.  
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4.   Structural and Procedural Safeguards 
 Any international intervention to maintain or restore peace and 
security is already a second- or third-best solution. It means that the 
domestic actors have failed to find a way to lead their own society 
through its transitional phase. But the international community is 
unlikely to intervene absent pressing need. Given that the conse-
quences of failing to intervene are often more violence, prolonged 
conflict, or ongoing serious human rights violations, international in-
tervention sometimes becomes the lesser of the evils. That was the 
calculation that the international community made with respect to 
Bosnia and Kosovo. And though no international reform strategy will 
succeed in avoiding all of the risks and imperfections inherent in 
such an undertaking, there are means through which the dangers 
posed by the media regulation aspect of international intervention 
can be minimized.  
 First, all regulations should be required to comport with the re-
quirements set out in the international human rights treaties— that 
any restrictions placed on free expression are provided for by law200 
and are no more restrictive than necessary.201 This means that, as 
discussed above in the context of hate speech regulation, any press 
regulation and the potential sanctions for violation or noncompliance 
should be clearly and publicly spelled out prior to its enforcement. 
For example, recall that, in response to Dita’s publication of the 
name and address of an alleged Serb collaborator that resulted in his 
death, the SRSG shut down production of Dita for eight days.202 Not 
only was the sanction itself based solely on the arbitrary determina-
tion of the SRSG, but it was meted out based on the accusation that 
Dita’s actions “violated the letter and spirit of Security Council reso-
lution 1244”—the resolution that established UNMIK’s mandate.203 
Such a vague basis for regulatory action can hardly satisfy the “pro-
hibited by law” requirement. Local reaction to the SRSG’s response 
was uniformly negative, even by independent media outlets who 
normally opposed the type of reporting in papers like Dita. In fact, 
the independent daily Koha Ditore published a report in support of 
Dita, arguing that Dita was not the only paper to publish lists of sus-
pected war criminals.204 This objection seemed more based on the dis-
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cretionary nature of the SRSG’s ability to sanction media outlets 
than on any sense of solidarity with Dita’s message.205 The regula-
tors’ response, even to conduct as outrageous as Dita’s, cannot be ar-
bitrary. The regulated entities or industry must feel confident that 
regulatory decisions and the determination of sanctions are made ac-
cording to a reasonable, predictable, and generally applicable rule 
of law.  
 Similarly, whatever regulations or policies are adopted must be 
enforced consistently according to their own terms, without regard to 
the political preferences of the regulators themselves—either indi-
vidually or as representatives of a national government or intergov-
ernmental body. There were several occasions where this principle 
was not followed in Bosnia and Kosovo, thus vindicating the fears of 
the media watchdog groups that were so opposed to any form of regu-
lation for fear that such regulation would be used as a political tool. 
Inconsistent and selective enforcement of regulatory directives indi-
cates that the international control over media content was not al-
ways administered in a neutral manner. Instead, governmental or 
quasi-governmental power was sometimes brought to bear with a 
particular political agenda in mind.  
 Illustrative examples took place in the context of efforts to reform 
Bosnia’s broadcast landscape. In the summer of 1997 with elections 
on the horizon for the fall, the Serbian network, SRT, split into two 
factions with one production center in Pale loyal to Radovan 
Karadzic and the other in Banja Luka, favoring Biljana Plavsic.206 
The international community, which was firmly in favor of Plavsic’s 
candidacy, responded to a series of inflammatory broadcasts that 
were highly critical of both political candidates sympathetic to the 
goals of the international community and the international authori-
ties themselves by having the international peacekeeping forces 
(SFOR) seize several of SRT-Pale’s key transmitters, which in effect, 
bolstered Plavsic’s political strength.207  
 When similar political considerations advised against interven-
tion, however, those considerations seemed to win the day. Erotel 
was the broadcast entity that illegally relayed the Croatian state 
television, HTV, throughout Bosnia via HRT. The broadcasts were 
typical of Bosnian broadcasts at the time, often using inflammatory 
language and criticizing SFOR and other international organizations 
as enemies of the Croat people.208 Despite exhibiting characteristics 
similar to those of the SRT broadcasts that had prompted SFOR’s in-
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tervention in 1997, no action was taken to prevent Erotel’s broad-
casts, in part to protect the electoral chances of opposition parties 
in Croatia.209  
 There were indications that interference with broadcasts and pub-
lications were more likely to occur when such interference would fur-
ther the UN or the American political agenda in Kosovo as well. For 
example, there were instances where media outlets that criticized 
KFOR or the UN, describing them as occupying forces, were shut 
down or punished.210 When a newspaper is punished for publishing 
criticisms of the government—and in the case of Kosovo, the UN was 
the only government that existed—the free press concerns raised by 
the international media groups are most salient. So long as the in-
ternational regulators can be seen as impartial actors, always pursu-
ing the goals of media reform and enforcing rules and regulations 
evenhandedly, it is more resistant to accusations of media censor-
ship. But when those regulations are applied selectively or with a 
particular agenda in mind, the larger reform effort is likely to be 
compromised. The selective enforcement of restrictions so as to aid 
favored political factions merely serves to vindicate the objections 
posed by international watchdog groups, undermine the local popula-
tion’s trust in the regulators, and set a poor example of the type of 
rule of law the local government is expected to respect as the reform 
process goes forward.  
 The risk of importing political agendas into regulatory implemen-
tation points to a third structural safeguard that should be part of 
any media regulation plan. The person, persons, or regulatory body 
who will administer any given regulatory scheme must have certain 
qualities. First, they should not be beholden to the equivalent of state 
government authorities, whether those are UN administrators or lo-
cal political leaders. Media restrictions are anathema in established 
democracies not because, in the abstract, such regulations can never 
serve a useful purpose. Instead, it is the very real risk that any regu-
latory power over media content can be manipulated by those wield-
ing the levers of power to entrench their own interests, and to un-
dermine political opposition. Indeed, authoritarian regimes regularly 
use such power to crush dissent and to ensure their own continued 
domination. The risk posed by these inherently dangerous powers is 
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most acute when the holders of power have interests that may incen-
tivize misuse of regulatory authority. Conversely, the more removed 
from the local political struggles the media regulators are, the 
smaller the temptation to use their regulatory power improperly. The 
regulators and any member of an appeals body should be independ-
ent operators whose sole concern is media reform, who are not bound 
to any other aspect of the UN or OSCE or NATO mandate, and who 
are not affiliated with any particular local faction.  
 Second, these individuals ideally would have both expertise in 
media issues and significant expertise in local affairs as well. As dis-
cussed above, the question whether a particular instance of expres-
sion should qualify for regulation or sanctions will be hugely depend-
ent on the context provided by the local language, history, and cul-
ture. Media reformers who are unfamiliar with these factors will be 
less effective in identifying and rooting out the truly problematic me-
dia content. 
 Next, setting out a range of possible government action—from 
criminal prosecution at one extreme to requiring the publication of a 
correction at the other—is, in itself, a form of structural safeguard. 
The existence of many possible responses means that regulators can 
tailor the speech-restrictiveness of their response to the severity of 
the regulatory violations. Moreover, just as the regulations for hate 
speech must clearly set out with respect to substantive content what 
is permitted and what is forbidden,211 the rules must be written to 
detail which types of violations are eligible for which sanctions. 
Then, regulators would not have the power to respond in draconian 
fashion to less problematic violations and their leeway to administer 
discretionary, possibly selective enforcement would be curtailed. 
 When considering procedural and structural safeguards, it is also 
important to recall a point made at the outset of this Article: the de-
mocratization process is long-term, encompassing many phases, and 
measures that are considered appropriate during one phase may not 
be suitable during another. With this in mind, no regulatory system 
put in place by the international community should be considered 
permanent. In fact, such a system should be considered one of the 
initial reforms that is implemented and should be phased out as soon 
as possible. The media likely will gradually transition as the other 
institutions of government and civil society do the same. The process 
therefore should be constantly and closely monitored so that when, at 
any point, a particular regulation or restriction that has been im-
posed on the media is no longer necessary, it can be discontinued. 
Initially, for example, perhaps relatively heavy-handed intervention 
is required to ensure the safety of independent journalists. But as the 
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police force and legal system builds capacity to ensure the physical 
protection of journalists, media reformers may turn their attention 
away from that area. Similarly, as journalists become accustomed to 
the codes of conduct to which they are expected to adhere and as the 
public becomes accustomed to the superior information sources that 
professional media provide, less regulation might be necessary. At 
that point, international authorities might turn over the monitoring 
and enforcement of codes of professional conduct to local professional 
organizations, taking those responsibilities out of the hands of regu-
latory authorities. This sort of multi-phased transitional process will 
result in the least amount of regulation that is necessary at any 
given time. 
 The temporary nature of transitional reform policies provides an-
other safeguard as well. The regulating entity is not a local govern-
ment authority that can stay in power indefinitely and use its control 
over the media to consolidate its power. Instead, any regulatory au-
thority will be in place only as long as necessary to accomplish its 
mandate. Given the financial and political constraints on long-term 
nation-building projects, international reformers have every incen-
tive to accomplish their goals as soon as possible, effect the necessary 
changes in the media sector, and then relinquish authority over that 
media. In any event, the vast majority of the regulatory measures 
contemplated in this Article should be discontinued when a local gov-
ernment takes over full control of governance. The concerns voiced by 
the international media organizations become much more salient 
when local political actors take over. While the international com-
munity’s goals are to restore or create conditions for a successful lib-
eral democracy, local politicians want to gain and maintain power. 
Therefore, while any government intervention into media content 
raises some concerns, international authorities’ intervention in areas 
where they have temporary control are less problematic because they 
have less of an incentive to use that power for selfish ends.212 To 
avoid this type of abuse, any media regulation scheme that goes be-
yond internationally accepted norms should be dismantled before full 
authority is restored to local actors.  
 Finally, as with any use of coercive power by a government au-
thority, there must be an opportunity for independent review of regu-
latory decisions. The systems ultimately implemented in both Bosnia 
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and Kosovo provided for appellate review of sanctioning decisions.213 
And the experience in Kosovo showed that such review could be im-
plemented effectively when the Media Appeals Board there over-
turned the media Commissioner’s imposition of a fine because it “had 
not satisfied the procedural guarantees required by . . . the applica-
ble law in Kosovo,” and referred the case back to the Commissioner 
for re-evaluation.214 As noted above, the members of any review board 
must be politically and financially independent both from national 
and international authorities, and from those regulators making the 
initial sanctioning decisions. 
IV.   IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ 
 Any contemporary discussion of democratization immediately 
raises the specter of Iraq. Indeed, the study of democratization in 
Bosnia and Kosovo is little more than an interesting historical anec-
dote if it cannot offer insight that might prove useful in other con-
texts. So while Iraq differs considerably from the Balkans in the de-
tails of its historical, political, cultural, religious, and media experi-
ence, perhaps some of the lessons to be drawn from the efforts to de-
mocratize Bosnia and Kosovo’s media can suggest approaches to help 
overcome the challenges that media reform efforts face in Iraq. This 
Part will consider the nascent media reform efforts in Iraq in light of 
the factors that seemed to present hurdles to the development of an 
ideal free press in Bosnia and Kosovo. Based on those factors, it then 
offers some critiques of the media reforms that already have been 
implemented in Iraq, as well as some recommendations for how to 
move forward most effectively there. Again, given that each democra-
tization process is historically contingent and highly dependent on 
contextual circumstances that will vary from place to place, no de-
finitive formula may be developed. The hope is, however, that point-
ing out relevant considerations will provide some useful guidance.  
 At first glance, Iraq seems to share many of the problematic ele-
ments present in Bosnia and Kosovo—the type of elements that both 
justified and necessitated a departure from liberal democratic norms 
in the means of media reform. As the post-war rebuilding phase has 
made abundantly clear, Iraq is a deeply divided society. And while 
the current conflict did not break out because of these divisions, any 
national Iraqi consciousness that existed under Saddam Hussein’s 
regime has been eroded by the ongoing sectarian violence that 
emerged in the wake of the U.S.-led overthrow of the Ba’athist gov-
ernment. The current focus of international efforts is to break down 
the salience of these divisions and reestablish a reconciled, national 
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identity under a centralized unity government. But unless and until 
that happens, one of Iraq’s defining characteristics is its divisions. 
And regardless of whether the unity government succeeds in crafting 
a political compromise to end the current violence, those divisions 
and the harms that have been carried out as a result of them in the 
past several years likely will remain a prominent feature of Iraqi 
civil society. And while the Iraqi media does not have a history of ex-
acerbating divisions within Iraqi society, it has begun to contribute 
to or, at the very least, reflect increasingly these emerging and deep-
ening societal schisms.215 
 The ever-present threat of violence in Iraq is so pervasive that it 
hardly bears mentioning here. Bosnia and Kosovo were emerging 
from civil war when their media reform schemes were implemented. 
And while the possibility of renewal of the recent violence still bub-
bled just beneath the surface, susceptible to triggering by an irre-
sponsible or agenda-driven media, that threat did not rise to the 
same level that Iraqis tolerate on a daily basis. In some ways, per-
haps it does not even make sense to discuss Iraq as a post-conflict 
nation. Some would say that it is in the process of post-conflict de-
mocratization. But others could argue that, while the U.S.-led war to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein may have ended, Iraq now is entangled 
in a complex civil war being fought along the current societal fault 
lines. But whatever the diagnosis of the current state of affairs, me-
dia reform—though certainly not a priority—already is underway. 
And such reform should strive to help ensure that the media serve as 
a force for peace rather than a force that encourages or exacerbates 
inter-sectarian tensions. Unfortunately, the ethno-sectarian divisions 
that receive so much attention in Iraq are increasingly reflected in 
both the broadcast and print media. In the words of one commenta-
tor, “[r]ather than a media sphere, Iraq has ethno-sectarian media 
‘spherecules’ that have the potential to further the gap between 
Iraq’s communities, developing identities along ethno-sectarian lines 
and weakening any kind of national belonging.”216 Media reform ef-
forts thus need to focus on preventing the Iraqi media from becom-
ing, like the media did in so many Balkan nations, yet another force 
contributing to the ongoing war and strife and violence.  
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 With respect to its history of an independent and professional me-
dia, such a thing has rarely been permitted to flourish in the Arab-
speaking world, and Iraq is no different.217 Recent years have exhib-
ited the worst record of media freedom. Even before the Ba’ath party 
took over governance of Iraq, leftist and nationalist sentiment among 
journalists in Iraq had led to significant government interference 
with the press and very little opposition to that interference, even 
from journalists.218 The ascendancy of the Ba’ath party and, in par-
ticular the regime of Saddam Hussein, led to intensified control of 
the media to the point where any vestige of press freedom was re-
placed with a media that was effectively a mouthpiece of the regime 
and a tool for the dissemination of Ba’athist ideology.219 Effective me-
dia reform thus requires more than simply regime change and the 
enactment of formal rules requiring adherence to principles of jour-
nalistic professionalism. It requires both government officials and 
journalists to change their old patterns of behavior and to learn an 
entirely new skill set. 
 At the same time, there is reason to be relatively optimistic about 
the Iraqi media sector’s legacy. While the media has certainly been 
used as a propaganda tool, historically it has not contributed to and 
inflamed conflict in Iraq in the way that it has in Balkan countries. 
Further, while the media has certainly been abused, censored, and 
restricted, prior to the fall of Saddam it was not an independent 
source of tension. In other words, while the history of the Iraqi media 
does not reflect the liberal, democratic model of an independent free 
press, it also does not conform to the example of Bosnia and Kosovo, 
where the media was an additional instrument of conflict.   
 So societal circumstances in Iraq mirror, in some senses, the chal-
lenges to media reform encountered in both Bosnia and Kosovo. The 
media’s role in contributing to violence is less significant, and the 
threat of renewed or continued inter-sectarian violence is more sig-
nificant. But in the end the same barriers to reform—deep societal 
divisions, significant risk of violence, and a dearth of embedded cul-
ture of professional journalism—are extant. Despite these warning 
signs, media reform efforts embarked upon in Iraq exhibit only in-
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cremental improvements over their Bosnian and Kosovar counter-
parts. Unfortunately, many of the same shortcomings have arisen 
once again.  
 First, there is the now-familiar effort to create a nationwide, plu-
ralist media source, the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). This effort in-
cluded not only reshaping the Iraq State Television channel into sat-
ellite broadcaster Al-Iraqiyya, but also two ground-based channels, 
two radio stations, and a newspaper.220 IMN was envisioned as a me-
dia entity that would provide a variety of types of multi-lingual pro-
gramming, including entertainment and educational content. This 
programming mandate was designed, inter alia, to foster and en-
courage the development of a pluralist civil society and the rule of 
law.221 Despite millions of dollars of investment in the project,222 IMN 
still fails to live up to its mission. It first was seen as a mouthpiece 
for the CPA, then it established itself as a channel free of American 
editorial influence, and finally it came to reflect the agenda of the 
Iraqi government, emphasizing unity along with an alleged Shi’a-
Kurdish bias.223  
 The short history of IMN is similar to that of Kosovo’s RTK. Recall 
that the United Nations relaunched the former state television entity 
RTP, which had been a mouthpiece for Milosevic’s views, as RTK, 
which was intended to be a national pluralist broadcast entity in 
Kosovo. It spent the first two years of its existence battling the per-
ception that it was a propaganda tool of the United Nations, KFOR, 
and the United States. When editorial control was relinquished to 
Kosovars, however, the network fell prey to political pressures, much 
like the rest of the media had, engendering claims of bias and pursuit 
of a partisan agenda through RTK’s airwaves.224  
 IMN seems to have suffered the same fate. In a nation lacking a 
deep-seated journalistic culture of independence where competing 
factions are vying for political power, editorial choices are unlikely to 
reflect the independence and other hallmarks of professionalism re-
quired by liberal free press models. Iraq’s brief post-war public 
broadcast experience thus far simply reinforces the lessons that Kos-
ovo and RTK taught.  
 Iraq also shows evidence of the competing pressures with respect 
to content regulation and government intervention in the media sec-
tor that were present in both Bosnia and Kosovo. On the one hand, 
U.S. policy in the immediate post-Saddam era reflected an optimism 
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for freedom of the press. It therefore permitted, and even encour-
aged, the emergence of a rash of new publications.225 In fact, the me-
teoric increase in the number of media outlets, as well as inroads into 
the Iraqi airwaves by regional satellite networks (Al-Alam from Iran 
and Al-Jazeerza) led to a sort of media chaos.226 This hands-off ap-
proach reflected the typical U.S. approach to media, reflected in the 
positions of the WPFC and the New York Times, which prohibits any 
government intervention in the media sector in the name of liberal-
ism.  
 On the other hand, those in charge in Iraq—at first the American 
authorities and later the Iraqis themselves—recognized the need to 
exert some control over the proliferating Iraqi media and to react ag-
gressively to inaccurate or inflammatory reporting.227 Early efforts to 
that end led to Coalition Order 14, under which Ambassador Paul 
Bremer had the sole authority to close media organizations.228 Any 
media outlet shut down under this order could appeal the decision 
only to Bremer himself.229 Order 14, whose proclaimed purpose was 
to enhance stability and prevent the inflammation of tensions 
through irresponsible journalism,230 was used to close or ban media 
outlets temporarily and to detain editors or managers.231 But the per-
ception, no doubt resulting in part from the anemic process provided 
to the accused media under Order 14 and in part due to the pre-
sumption against government intervention discussed at length 
above, was that the order was being used to suppress speech unnec-
essarily.232 Order 14’s inability to deal effectively with the challenges 
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posed by Iraq’s post-war media sphere prompted authorities to de-
sign a more comprehensive media policy.233   
 After much political wrangling, Order 65 emerged to impose some 
sense of order on the post-war media scene.234 This order represented 
a giant leap forward from the relatively arbitrary Order 14. Order 65 
established the Communications and Media Commission of Iraq 
(CMC) to enact rules, regulations, and codes applicable to the media, 
as well as the procedural framework for the enforcement of those 
rules.235 The regulatory framework that Order 65 purports to fashion 
has many laudable qualities: Commissioners are chosen for their po-
litical independence and professional expertise; the CMC is both ad-
ministratively and financially independent of the government; it sets 
out clear rules, regulations, and codes of practice; it provides guid-
ance regarding accuracy and balance in reporting; it prohibits in-
citement to violence; it sets forth the sanctions the CMC can impose 
and requires that they be proportionate to the offense committed.236 
 It is, however, far from perfect. Some of its elements are simply 
ill-conceived. First, it calls for the press code of ethics to be imple-
mented through a system of self-regulation.237 As we have seen be-
fore, in a situation where the history of media professionalism is not 
engrained, where professional associations are nascent, where, in 
short, the culture of a liberal free press in the Western European im-
age has yet to take root, self-regulation is likely to result in no regu-
lation at all. In addition, the Broadcasting Code of Practice (which is 
enforceable by the CMC) leaves ambiguous too many of its provi-
sions—incitement, for example, must be more clearly defined.238 And 
the CMC procedures do not live up to the due process ideals neces-
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sary to protect media defendants from unwarranted restrictions on 
their expression.239 Perhaps more problematic than these conceptual 
elements of the CMC framework are the problems that the CMC has 
faced in practice. As of May 2007, the CMC had not received or initi-
ated any complaints under the mandatory Codes of Practice, and its 
rules are routinely flouted by domestic and international broadcast-
ers alike.240 Some journalists have never even heard of the CMC; oth-
ers complain that it simply looks the other way in the face of viola-
tions.241   
 The implementation of Order 65 early in the post-war era repre-
sents a significant improvement over what took place in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Rather than hesitating to assert regulations over the media 
and bowing to pressure from outside groups largely ignorant of the 
specific circumstances involved, media reform was placed on the 
agenda right away. A concerted effort that included local and inter-
national input attempted to craft a regulatory framework both to en-
courage press freedom and to prevent the media from contributing to 
instability.242 It is a good start. And despite some imperfections, it 
sets in place many of the necessary tools. One can hope both that the 
CMC’s implementation efforts will improve over time as its capacity 
slowly ramps up to speed and that the permanent media law, still yet 
to be enacted as of this writing, addresses some of the substantive 
failings of Order 65.  
 Unfortunately, there may not be time to wait patiently for im-
provement. Few of the new media entities formed in the post-war era 
exhibit the type of media professionalism and independence consid-
ered the hallmarks of an ideal free press. Instead, with a few signifi-
cant exceptions, these publications fail to live up to professional 
standards, and instances of balanced reporting are few and far be-
tween.243 In fact, the media is dominated by outlets controlled by 
ethno-sectarian or political factions,244 who see media as it was seen 
under Saddam: as a tactical tool to be used to support the group that 
sponsors it.245 
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 The most disturbing aspect of the current media environment—
and the one that makes effective intervention all the more urgent—is 
that it seems to be deteriorating over time. Media that emerged in 
the immediate aftermath of the war used the ethno-centric labels in 
the context of calling for unity among the different groups.246 Over 
time, however, the labels have become increasingly divisive, reflect-
ing the similar trend in local politics, and setting the groundwork for 
conflict.247 Political parties running on non-sectarian platforms do not 
have enough followers to be able to field a network, so that perspec-
tive is not part of the broadcast or print media picture.248 While there 
are some independent channels operating to further participation by 
civil society, providing outlets for civic expression, criticism of the 
government, and giving a voice to the people’s concerns,249 they face 
nearly insurmountable challenges. For example, they lack the finan-
cial support that their politically and ethnically aligned counterparts 
enjoy.250 Moreover, their access to information is often restricted to 
prevent reporting undesirable stories, and their employees are sub-
ject to blackmail, death threats, and physical violence.251 In short, the 
media is becoming increasingly factionalized, increasingly aligned 
with religious or sectarian agendas, and increasingly likely to con-
tribute to violent conflict rather than provide a forum for reconcilia-
tion and compromise.  
 Given this disturbing trend, more assertive intervention by the 
CMC could potentially halt or slow the backsliding into sectarianism 
evidenced in the media. Aggressive enforcement of regulations re-
garding fair and balanced reporting and against hate speech and in-
citement might prevent the media from becoming yet another desta-
bilizing force in Iraq.  
 Reformers in Iraq also must be more mindful of the safeguards 
that make press regulation less troubling. The first of these is the as-
surance that media regulations will not be enforced selectively in or-
der to further the regulators’ political agenda. This is especially sali-
ent with respect to the use of Order 14. An example is the case of Al 
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Hawza, a popular Shiite newspaper. Ambassador Bremer ordered the 
paper closed for allegedly inciting violence against coalition troops in 
the form of publishing inaccurate anti-American rumors. The closure 
was controversial, seen by many as a self-serving American imposi-
tion of censorship.252 But when Iraq’s interim prime minister, Iyad 
Allawi, ordered the paper reopened, that too, was regarded as a po-
litical move—an effort to curry favor with radical elements of Iraq’s 
citizenry.253 Another troubling aspect of the use of Order 14 is the 
fact that, even after the promulgation of Order 65, Order 14 contin-
ued to be invoked to close media outlets.254 Thus, despite the creation 
of a comprehensive regulatory framework, the relatively arbitrary 
use of Order 14 continued.  
 The indictment of Order 14 as a political censorship tool rests in 
large part on its glaring procedural failings: It fails to define incite-
ment, it does not provide equitable enforcement procedures or ade-
quate due process protections, it permits imprisonment as a sanc-
tion,255 and appeals of its penalties are decided by the same authority 
that initially imposed the sanction.256 Each of these troubling aspects 
of Order 14 remains relevant, because Order 100 gave the authority 
to enforce Order 14 to the Iraqi authorities following the handover 
of power.257 
 Nor does Order 65 contain all of the procedural safeguards neces-
sary to limit abuse and censorship. As mentioned above, the proce-
dures established for handling complaints are not ideal. They fail to 
provide clear evidentiary rules, to identify the standard of proof that 
will be used, and to indicate whether there is a right to call witnesses 
or to legal assistance.258 In addition, while the Order 65 framework 
provides for an appeals process, the appointments to the appeals 
board have not been made.259 These complaints are perhaps prema-
ture, given that the CMC has yet to initiate any proceedings. But if it 
is to step in and address the increasingly hostile, sectarian tone in 
the Iraqi media, it must be prepared to do so in a way that is unim-
peachable. In order to do that, it must insist on the procedural safe-
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guards necessary to fend off allegations of unnecessary censorship or 
arbitrary decisions.  
 The final issue Iraq raises with respect to safeguards against un-
warranted media intervention is a complex one in this context. Recall 
in the discussion of Bosnia and Kosovo the importance of placing the 
tools of regulation in independent, neutral hands, rather than in the 
control of individuals or groups who might be more tempted to use 
them for illicit purposes. While the UN was in charge of civil admini-
stration of Kosovo in its post-war period, and Dayton charged OSCE 
with the task of democratization of Bosnia’s post-war institutions, 
the international community has no such mandate in Iraq. Under the 
current political arrangements, regulations and anti-incitement 
measures will be imposed by the Iraqi government itself. This raises 
concerns that are less prominent when international regulators are 
in charge. One reason that the principle of nonregulation is so strong 
is the historical tendency of rulers to use regulation as a means of 
stifling criticism of or dissent against the government itself. And it 
was, in part, fear of setting a precedent for this type of use of regula-
tion that prompted such vocal opposition to regulatory schemes in 
Bosnia and Kosovo.260 In those places, however, the regulatory re-
gime was aimed at preventing one local faction from criticizing an-
other, not at stifling critical commentary of government actions or 
the dissemination of information unfavorable to governing authori-
ties.261 But once the regulatory reins are handed over to the local 
government, the risk that it will be used for these improper pur-
poses increases.  
 The regulatory regime in Iraq does make efforts to ensure the in-
dependence and nonpartisanship of membership on the CMC and its 
appeals board.262 But they are purely Iraqi. Moreover, as noted above, 
Order 100 gave the Iraqi prime minister the power to continue media 
enforcement authority under Order 14 after he took over.263 There is 
no simple solution to this situation. If the Iraqis are willing, perhaps 
administration of media regulation could be handed over to an inde-
pendent international body, such as the OSCE or the UN. Or per-
haps the hearings and boards could include media professionals from 
outside Iraq.264 Whatever the solution, this concern must be ad-
dressed, because it is clear that journalists and reporting are seen as 
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elements of the political struggle. In addition to the targeting of 
journalists for violence, kidnapping, and assassination, accusations 
of the prosecution of journalists for political purposes are already be-
ing made.265 
 As discussed above, stability is one of the fundamental elements 
of established democracies that are often taken for granted when 
considering principles that should guide media reform in societies in 
transition. Stability includes respect for the rule of law as well as ac-
ceptance, both by political actors and by civil society, of the accepted 
liberal democratic norms. In places where this acceptance is still an 
aspiration and not a reality, establishing the preconditions necessary 
for a free, independent, responsible press becomes a challenge. The 
broader media environment must permit access to relevant 
information and refrain from exerting or permitting others to exert 
pressure—such as overt censorship, intimidation, defamation 
punishments, or physical threats—that might chill journalists’ 
speech and affect their editorial decisions.266 Without meeting these 
preconditions, even the most well-meaning journalist will struggle to 
satisfy the requirements of professionalism, and reform efforts can 
hardly hope to succeed. 
 Unfortunately, it is in this area where Iraq is perhaps most dis-
tinguishable from Bosnia and Kosovo. Violence and the absence of 
basic rule of law pervade not just the media environment but all of 
Iraqi life. Iraq is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be 
a journalist.267 Journalists who report on news in a way that dis-
pleases certain political parties are targeted for violence.268 And be-
cause the Iraqi state has struggled to protect its citizens generally, 
there is certainly no way to guarantee that it will protect journalists. 
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Moreover, the breakdown of the pre-existing system of authority was 
much more complete in Iraq than it was in Bosnia or Kosovo. While 
this has benefits in the sense that it dissolves old power structures 
that might have controlled and manipulated the media, it also has 
left the country with almost no semblance of stability on which to 
build. Instead, it is a complete reconstruction. 
 The volatility of life in Iraq adversely affects the development of 
rule of law and culture in other ways as well. While NGOs of all 
shapes, sizes, and agendas were engaged in both Bosnia and Kosovo, 
very few are currently operating in Iraq. Their absence can be ex-
plained partly by safety concerns,269 and partly by a lack of familiar-
ity in partnering with the military authorities currently in charge in 
Iraq. NGOs are more familiar with diplomats than with soldiers.270 
As a result, one valuable resource that is normally quite active in en-
couraging the development of civil society in democratizing or transi-
tional societies is simply not a factor in Iraq.  
 So where does all of this leave Iraq? In some ways, there is reason 
for optimism. The existing regulatory system, designed by those with 
experience in Bosnia and Kosovo in conjunction with the Iraqis, con-
tains many of the hallmarks of an ideal media regulation scheme. 
The media sector is exceedingly pluralist, consisting of many voices 
from many different perspectives. And some of those voices are oper-
ating as a true check on government action, challenging corruption 
and providing an outlet for citizens’ concerns.  
 But there are disturbing trends as well. The increasing divisive-
ness of the media and the disintegration of the overall media sphere 
into what one commentator describes as “sphericules,” which each 
set out their own perspective, but which reaches only an audience 
that shares this perspective, are both present in Iraq. Within their 
sphericule, each group portrays itself as a victim of the others, 
thereby increasing tension and the perceived need for self-defense, 
leading to further polarization.271 The result is that instead of a 
healthy pluralism permitting public debate on contested issues, there 
is simply an increasingly loud cacophony of voices reinforcing their 
own points of view in increasingly hostile terms. 
 In this context, the effect on the ground of Iraq’s well-crafted regu-
lation scheme is seemingly negligible. In other words, all of the rules, 
regulations, and codes of practice may be only so many words, super-
ficially imposed over a much more complex situation which was not 
the result of and is not amenable to reform through any conscious ef-
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fort.272 The political realities on the ground, the lack of physical secu-
rity, and the sectarianism of vying factions are simply too powerful 
for even the most well-designed reform plan to overcome. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The foregoing arguments may appear as attempts to justify anti-
democratic, totalitarian, or illiberal measures against the media in 
post-conflict societies. And to many, even the desirable end known as 
democracy may not be pursued through such means. What this Arti-
cle posits, however, is that there are fundamental differences be-
tween democracy and democratization. It also posits that the condi-
tions presented by some nations during the democratization process 
both render that process extremely fragile and make some liberal 
democratic principles temporarily irrelevant. The norms regarding 
the free press developed in the context of stable democracies not only 
serve to preserve the democratic nature of those societies; these same 
norms also rely upon the media environment provided by that de-
mocratic setting to be effective. Media norms in an established lib-
eral democracy are both a cause and an effect of that stable political 
climate. Once this fundamental relationship between norms and sta-
bility is recognized, it becomes less obvious that, in the absence of es-
tablished democracy, the same set of norms and principles remain 
suitable. In other words, when the conditions in a transitional society 
do not reflect democratic conditions, the application of democratic 
norms will be ineffective. And because they will be ineffective, strict 
adherence to them should not be required.  
 The early democratization period in both Bosnia and Kosovo ex-
hibited several characteristics that justify a departure from the ap-
plication of liberal democratic principles. The deep societal divisions 
and the concomitant ethnic-based regional or sectarian power struc-
tures and political consciousnesses, the recent violent conflict and its 
lingering tensions that threatened to lead to renewed violence, and 
the lack of culturally embedded democratic traditions all contributed 
to a media environment incapable of fulfilling its assigned roles in a 
democratic society as watchdog, as an information disseminator, and 
as a sphere for public debate. So while the aim of international regu-
lators and reformers to establish a pluralist, independent, and pro-
fessional media in Bosnia and in Kosovo is the appropriate goal, 
making the assumption that this goal could be achieved without 
modifying the usual rules that are applied to the media to accommo-
date the conditions with which these reformers were faced seems, in 
hindsight, naïve.  
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 International media reformers’ experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo 
indicate that, when deep divisions within society result in local resis-
tance to an independent media, aggressive regulation both to influ-
ence media content and to break down political control over the me-
dia may be necessary. When a recent conflict or extreme interethnic 
tension presents a real risk that certain media content may result in 
renewed violence or a destabilization of the democratization process, 
measures that may be considered impermissible censorship in other 
circumstances may be justified. When a national political conscious-
ness is less salient to citizens than their sectarian identity, intra-
ethnic media pluralism is likely to be more effective than attempts to 
create nationwide media pluralism. When local journalists lack the 
culture and tradition of media professionalism, permitting them to 
self-regulate will not result in a development of that culture. And 
when the non-media actors fail to respect the democratic norms sur-
rounding the media environment—avoiding exerting political influ-
ence over content, permitting access to information, etc.—a truly in-
dependent media is unlikely to develop.  
 While these lessons are highly contingent on the specific condi-
tions present in Bosnia and Kosovo—deeply divided societies with re-
cent conflict along ethnic lines and a history of media contribution to 
ethnic and political tensions—the hope is that they will nonetheless 
prove useful to future reform efforts. At the very least, the experience 
of Bosnia and Kosovo indicate that reformers must pay close atten-
tion to the context in which they are working, that they must craft 
reforms and regulations to address the hurdles to media democrati-
zation that exist there, and that when the preconditions for the 
proper functioning of liberal norms do not exist, they must depart 
from those norms in order to create a media environment where ul-
timately those norms will be respected. 
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